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 Abstract 
 
Three Essays on Political Regimes, Military Spending, and Economic Growth 
 
 
Pavel A. Yakovlev 
 
This dissertation is a collection of essays on the issues in political and defense economics. 
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the role that political and institutional arrangements play 
in affecting government policy and economic well-being. The second chapter examines how 
different political regimes and military manpower systems affect the value of life in military 
conflicts. The results in Chapter 2 show that democracies suffer lower battlefield casualties than 
dictatorships. Also noteworthy is that more volunteer based armies, per capita income, and 
economic freedom lead to lower battlefield deaths. Thus, political and economic liberties are 
found to increase the value of life in military conflicts. Chapter 3 investigates how arms trade 
and military spending affect economic growth. The results indicate that higher military spending 
and net arms exports lead, separately, to lower economic growth, but higher military spending 
appears to be less detrimental to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. The fourth 
chapter examines the relationship between incumbency advantage and legislative shirking or 
ideology. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage leads to more legislative shirking 
as evidenced by the departure of politicians from the median voter’s ideological preferences. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the dissertation, provides concluding remarks, and 
discusses opportunities for future research in the political economy of warfare. 
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 Chapter 1 
An Introduction to the Political Economy of Conflict, Military Spending, and 
Legislative Shirking 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Political economy is a subfield of economics that analyzes the interactions between political 
institutions and economic policies. Political and economic processes have long been considered 
intertwined. Scholarly research shows that political and legal institutions are significantly 
correlated with economic development and well-being. For instance, Persson (2002) finds 
empirical evidence consistent with the theory that different political regimes have a significant 
influence on fiscal policy, welfare, and corruption. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find 
that when economic and demographic variables are taken into account, democracies and non-
democracies differ significantly in military spending, torture, execution, censorship, and 
religious regulation. Thus, the importance and relevance of academic research in the field of 
political economy is clear.  
It is crucial to understand how economic and political forces interact together in order to 
make the world a better place via wise governance. In the following chapter, I extend the frontier 
of knowledge in the field of political economy by analyzing: (1) how different political regimes 
affect the value of life in military conflicts, (2) how military spending and arms trade affect 
economic growth, and (3) how elected officials deal with the tradeoff between their self-interest 
and reelection incentives when legislating constituents' preferences. In other words, my research 
examines how different political regimes and politicians' incentives affect government policy 
and, in turn, public well-being. The latter can be manifested in a variety of ways, ranging from 
higher standards of living to lower battlefield casualties. 
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1.2  Political Regimes and Military Conflicts 
The humanitarian and economic costs of conflicts can be astronomical. For this reason, humanity 
remains engaged in a struggle to prevent conflicts from occurring. This undertaking warrants a 
better understanding of what causes conflicts and how to prevent them or to lessen their burdens. 
A few researchers have discovered that geopolitical and economic factors may affect conflict 
initiations, payoffs, and outcomes. Filson and Werner (2004), for instance, develop a formal 
model of conflict showing that democratic regimes are sensitive to the institutional constraints 
and costs of war. They argue that this sensitivity affects the propensity of democratic regimes to 
accept negotiated settlements over wars and leads to the often noted tendency for democracies to 
select to fight low-cost, short wars that they can win. Garfinkel (1994) arrives at a similar 
conclusion for democracies by showing that political party competition, in association with 
electoral uncertainty, can reduce military spending and the severity of conflict between nations. 
Gartzke (2005), on the other hand, finds that economic freedom is fifty times more potent than 
political freedom in promoting peace. 
The works of the above scholars in political economy inspired me to study how political 
and economic factors may affect the level of casualties in a given conflict. Taking my own 
approach, I develop a theoretical model to analyze whether democracies and dictatorships, with 
volunteer or conscription armies, value life differently from one another when they are involved 
in military conflicts. My model yields formal theoretical insights into how economic and 
institutional factors may affect military capital intensity and subsequent combat casualties. The 
empirical evidence presented in this dissertation supports the model's prediction that more 
democratic nations with volunteer armies experience lower conflict casualties owing to their 
higher military capital intensity. I also find that higher reliance on conscription leads to lower 
military capital intensity, whereas higher real GDP per capita leads to higher military capital 
intensity. Moreover, I find that economic freedom is thirteen times more potent than political 
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freedom in increasing military capital intensity and saving more lives. One of my intriguing 
findings suggests that political and economic freedoms converge in the strength of their 
respective impacts on military capital intensity. 
 
1.3 “Guns vs. Butter” Debate Revisited 
Given the findings cited above that democracies tend to have higher defense expenditure per 
soldier than non-democracies, it would be worthwhile to examine how political regimes 
influence military spending and arms trade, which could have significant implications for 
economic growth. There is a large literature on the relationship between economic growth and 
military spending, but its findings are mixed and largely inconclusive. Some researchers find that 
military spending is positively related to growth, while others find the opposite result. This 
disagreement on the effect of military spending could stem partly from the non-linear growth 
effects of military expenditure and incorrect model specifications. Addressing these problems 
and controlling for country differences in political regimes and arms trade could improve our 
understanding of the complex issues involved in this debate. The interplay of military spending 
and arms trade, for instance, could have a priori unpredictable effect on growth.  
My research could bring new evidence to the debate on the growth effects of military 
spending, or the "butter vs. guns" tradeoff. In Chapter 3, I investigate the non-linear effects of 
military spending and arms trade on economic growth using the Solow and Barro growth models 
as recommended by Dunne et al. (2005). The empirical evidence indicates that military spending 
and arms exports have a significant negative effect on economic growth, but higher military 
spending is less detrimental to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. I also find 
that democracy is inversely related to the size of military expenditure as a share of GDP, 
providing at least some explanation for why democratic regimes and per capita incomes appear 
to be correlated. 
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1.4 The Incumbency Advantage and Legislative Shirking 
Economists identify two legitimate reasons to justify government intervention: (1) the 
enforcement of law and property rights and (2) the provision of public goods that a free market 
may fail to provide. Many governments around the world, however, take on more responsibilities 
than are considered legitimate by economists. In a representative democracy, elected officials are 
expected to act responsibly in enacting the preferences of their citizens. However, as is the case 
with the inefficient provision of public goods in a free market, the government itself may also be 
inefficient at providing these goods and services to its citizens. Think of voters as customers, and 
their elected officials as firms. This way, all of us can be thought of as operating in a market of 
some sort, the electoral market, in which our decisions are guided by self interest and some 
constraints. Voters, acting as customers, shop around for the best offers made by politicians, who 
are acting as competitive firms in this electoral market. Under the ideal conditions, this market 
would function efficiently; voters would elect the best politicians to enact the most preferred 
policies. If some of these ideal conditions are violated, then the efficient outcomes in the 
electoral markets may not be achieved. In a world of less than perfect competition, politicians 
may find it optimal to enact their own ideological preferences or to sell their votes to interest 
groups rather than to represent the interests of their constituents. Since information is costly, 
voters choose to be rationally ignorant, which makes it difficult for them to monitor and asses the 
performance of their elected representatives. This means that politicians do not have as much 
pressure to do their best, and they might find it possible to shirk on the job and still get reelected. 
Moreover, if incumbent politicians enjoy some kind of advantage over their challengers, then 
they are more likely to remain in office and to continue to shirk. 
Does this kind of shirking really happen? Does the incumbency advantage really increase 
legislative shirking? These are the kind of questions I ask and try to answer in Chapter 4 of my 
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dissertation. In this chapter, I develop and test the principal-agent model, in which political 
agents seeking reelection face a tradeoff between pursuing their own ideological preferences (i.e. 
shirking) and adhering to the preferences of their constituents. Using the aggregate elections data 
for the U.S. House of Representatives, I find evidence supporting the claim that the incumbency 
advantage reduces the tradeoff between shirking and reelection prospects for incumbents. My 
findings suggest that if voters expect their elected officials to enact the optimal policy, whether it 
is the size of military spending or something else, politicians may find it optimal to enact a 
policy that is closer to their own preferences instead of those of their voters. 
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 Chapter 2 
Do Democracies and Dictatorships Value Life Differently in Military 
Conflicts? 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There exists a rich literature devoted to studying conflict and related issues of imperative 
economic and humanitarian importance. In a survey of selected contributions to the economic 
analysis of conflict, Sandler (2000) points out the diversity and depth of issues that have been 
addressed by scholars. Yet, the contemporary economic literature seems to lack a rigorous 
theoretical and empirical analysis of how different political, institutional, and economic factors 
may affect the value of life and the size of combat casualties in military conflicts.  
This paper develops a theoretical model of warfare that provides insights into how 
different political regimes and military manpower systems may affect the relative value (price) 
of military personnel, capital intensity of military forces, and total combat casualties. I argue that 
democracies should have more capital intensive militaries than dictatorships because of the re-
election incentives to incur less combat casualties. As a result, more democratic nations suffer 
fewer battlefield deaths compared to less democratic nations. In light of the recent work by 
Gartzke (2005), who finds that economic freedom is fifty times more potent than democracy in 
promoting peace, I also analyze the effect of economic freedom (index developed by Gwartney 
and Lawson 2004) on battlefield deaths. 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper supports the model’s predictions that 
democracies value life more in military conflicts than dictatorships. A heavier reliance on 
conscription in acquiring military manpower leads to lower capital intensity, while higher real 
GDP per capita leads to higher capital intensity of military forces. I find that economic freedom 
is as much as thirteen times more potent than democracy in generating more capital intensive 
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military forces, leading to lower total battlefield deaths. Thus, the empirical evidence shows that 
political regimes and military manpower systems are still the significant determinants of value of 
life even after controlling for economic factors. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Most of the contemporary research on conflict and peace has been focused on the rational 
approach to studying conflict. Rational conflict theory postulates that warfare becomes an 
attractive dispute instrument when property rights are poorly defined and poorly enforced. In his 
book, Arms and Influence, Schelling (1966) argues that nations with complete information 
should never go to war because a peaceful settlement is less costly than a conflict. What is 
puzzling about conflicts, however, is that they may occur despite the possibility of having 
complete information and mutually superior peaceful bargains. Hirschleifer (1995) contends that 
anarchy is especially susceptible to conflict unless there are strongly diminishing returns to 
fighting and incomes exceed the viability minimum. Fearon (1995) suggests that bargains may 
not occur because of commitment problems due to incentives to renege on the bargain terms, 
issue indivisibilities (such as to legalize or not to legalize abortion), private information about 
relative military capabilities or resolve, and incentives to misrepresent such information. 
Moreover, Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) demonstrate that conflict could be the rational 
equilibrium outcome if the long-run gains from defeating an opponent outweigh the short-run 
losses. 
A number of researchers have also discovered that geographical, institutional, and 
economic factors may affect conflict initiations, payoffs, and outcomes. For instance, Filson and 
Werner (2004) develop a formal model of conflict showing that democratic regimes are sensitive 
to the institutional constraints and war costs. They argue that this sensitivity entices democratic 
regimes to accept negotiated settlements over wars and choose to fight only low cost and short 
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wars that they can win. Garfinkel (1994) arrives at a similar conclusion for democracies by 
showing that political party competition associated with electoral uncertainty can reduce military 
spending and the severity of conflict between nations. Similarly, Mitchell et. al. (1999) find 
support for the propositions that democratization decreases the systemic amount of war in 
addition to having a pacifying effect on war that increases over time. Biddle and Long (2004) 
find that factors like superior human capital, harmonious civil-military relations, and Western 
cultural background are highly correlated with democracies and are largely responsible for 
democracy's apparent military effectiveness.  
On the other hand, Hess and Orphanides (2001) show how economic recessions and 
president’s desire for re-election can instigate an otherwise avoidable war in order to show off 
president’s military prowess. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002), on the other hand, find that income 
inequality and pervasive rent-seeking by the ruling elites may lead to war and state violence. In 
his recent work, Gartzke (2005) shows that economic freedom is a much more potent 
determinant of peace than democracy. Gartzke (2005) finds that economic freedom is fifty times 
more potent in encouraging peace than democracy, which is a strong evidence for capitalism 
driven peace. 
From a more general political economy perspective, there is still much to learn about how 
political regimes and institutions relate to economic development and well-being. For instance, 
Persson (2002) finds empirical evidence consistent with the theory that different political 
regimes have a significant influence on government size, welfare-state programs, and corruption. 
Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find that when economic and demographic variables are 
taken into account, democracies do not differ significantly from non-democracies in affecting 
economic or social policies, but they do differ significantly in military spending, torture, 
execution, censorship, and religious regulation.  
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Considering the above findings, one might expect political regimes and military 
manpower systems (volunteer vs. conscription) to be among the significant determinants of 
military capital intensity and corresponding conflict casualties. The theoretical and empirical 
search for determinants of conflict casualties is well warranted, which sets the stage for the 
construction of this paper. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Model  
Intuitively, an ill-equipped (labor intensive) army should have higher combat casualties when 
fighting against a well-equipped (capital intensive) army, everything else being equal. Warfare 
entails a production of some kind of fighting or military output that requires a constrained choice 
of labor, capital, and technology. This choice is tempted by conflict payoffs and constrained by 
conflict costs. Thus, a warfare profit function seems like a well suited theoretical foundation for 
analyzing the optimal choice of capital and labor needed for warfare. The tricky part is how to 
incorporate the possible influence of political regimes and military manpower systems on the 
optimal choice of military capital and labor. Incorporating this influence would allow us to 
examine the relative value of life and the size of combat casualties being driven by differences in 
military capital intensity (i.e. capital-labor ratio) under democracy and dictatorship. 
Looking for theoretical elegance and simplicity, I try to model only how the essential 
differences between democracy and dictatorship, as well as conscription and volunteer armies, 
may affect military capital intensity and consequent combat casualties. I investigate how the 
relative value of labor (military personnel) varies between these four scenarios: (1) dictatorship 
with volunteer army, (2) dictatorship with conscription army, (3) democracy with volunteer 
army, and (4) democracy with conscription army. Each scenario works as if one would insert a 
given political regime and military manpower institution into the same hypothetical country to 
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compare and contrast the resulting changes in the relative value of military personnel and 
military’s capital to labor ratio. 
I assume that dictators in this model are able to capture at least some rewards from a 
successful war so that their incentives are aligned with maximizing warfare profits for given 
labor and capital costs. Arguably, dictators or autocratic governments in general, may perceive 
warfare or military build up in itself as a means of self-enrichment or rent seeking (Sandler, 
2000). Conversely, I assume that democratically elected leaders represent the preferences of the 
median voter and that the threat of being voted out of office keeps the elected officials in 
alignment with the vote maximizing political platform. In other words, democratically elected 
leaders maximize warfare profits on behalf of their constituents, who care about conflict benefits 
and costs.1 Overall, the only differences that might exist in all four scenarios must come from 
political or military manpower systems.  
Each decision maker in any of the four scenarios is assumed to be fighting separately 
some hypothetical enemy nation, rebel force, terrorist group, or a coalition of these. How 
successful the four decision makers are in capturing the disputed asset or conflict objective 
depends on their respective fighting effort Y compared to their enemy’s fighting effort YE. The 
respective fighting efforts of both warring sides can be combined together into some general 
functional form Q(Y, YE). This function could be thought of as the general functional form of the 
Contest Success Function (CSF) that is used extensively in the literature to specify how 
appropriative contest efforts lead to an appropriative contest outcome (Hirshleifer, 1995). If 
fighting an enemy coalition, the assumed general form CSF can be expressed as Q(Y, Y1E, Y2E,…, 
YnE). 
                                                 
1 Perhaps this dichotomous modeling of the differences between democracy and dictatorship is unrealistic since even 
dictatorships must have some public support (arguably much lower than in democracy) to avoid an uprising. 
However, this dichotomy allows for elegant theoretical conclusions without missing the main point that the two 
regimes differ in the extent to which they follow the preferences of their constituents.  
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Fighting effort Y is some production function with assumed constant returns to scale 
(CRS) in capital and labor. It can be written as Y=F(A, K, L), where A is the exogenous 
productivity parameter or technological constant, K is capital, and L is labor or military 
personnel. To simplify the analysis, capital and labor are assumed to be homogenous in ability, 
effort, and preferences and can be substituted for each other continuously. The hypothetical 
enemy nation, rebel, or terrorist group has its own fighting effort function labeled as YE=FE(AE, 
KE, LE) that is subject to the same properties. I assume that there is no uncertainty and that all 
decision makers have perfect information about each other’s military capabilities or fighting 
efforts. That is, the enemy’s combat output is known to the decision maker and is held constant 
when maximizing warfare profit.  
The supply of labor (soldiers) and capital (weapons) is assumed to be perfectly elastic so 
that any amount of labor and capital can be hired at the given prices determined in perfectly 
competitive factor markets.2 I assume that military volunteers can only be recruited by paying 
them the competitive market wage that fully reflects the risk and opportunity cost of this choice. 
Conscription is assumed to work as a random military draft that selects the necessary amount of 
conscripts. A conscription based army, by its principle, should pay its soldiers a conscription 
wage that is lower than the wage paid in a volunteer army. I assume that factor markets priced in 
all the risk preferences and private costs (except for externalities) for a given military conflict. 
The value or size of the contested asset or conflict objective is assumed to be fixed 
throughout the war. Fighting or warfare in this model serves merely as a means of achieving or 
capturing some objective (asset) with a known and certain payoff for a given level of enemy 
resistance. The conflict objective can be virtually anything: from capturing natural resources and 
land to “establishing democracy” in the opponents’ country. However, the necessary provision 
                                                 
2 Wages could be made endogenous in military output, which would reinforce the exogenous-wage model’s 
predictions, but make them unnecessarily complex as well.  
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for reaching the conflict objective might require the elimination of enemy resistance, say, 
measured in enemy combatants killed. Thus, if both parties’ fighting efforts Y and YE are 
measured in the same units (say combat losses), then a more specific functional form, like the 
ratio-based Contest Success Function (CSF), could be used instead of the general Q(Y, YE) 
warfare functional form. For example, in a two-party contest, fighting efforts by each side (F1 
and F2) can be combined together in the following ratio form. 
mm
m
FF
Fp
21
1
1 +=  and mm
m
FF
Fpp
21
2
12 1 +=−=  
Where p1 and p2 can be interpreted as the respective proportions of the prize won in a 
continuum, two-party conflict model. In this representation, military conflict is a continuous 
zero-sum game. In a two-party model of conflict, p1 and p2 can be interpreted as the respective 
probabilities of victory. According to Hirshleifer (1995), the parameter m in the CSF can be 
thought of as a decisiveness coefficient, which represents the degree to which greater fighting 
efforts translate into battlefield success. Setting m=1 makes this ratio based CSF concave with 
monotonically diminishing marginal returns throughout the entire [0, 1] continuum.  
However, I shall use some general form contest function as to make the model flexible 
enough to address a variety of conflicts: from conventional interstate warfare to fighting 
asymmetric wars against terrorists who try to achieve some political or resource transfer 
objectives (Enders and Sandler 1995). This general contest function can always assume some 
specific functional form that is better suited for a given conflict. Hirshleifer (2000) provides a 
good description of various contest success functions. The advantage of using the profit function 
as a theoretical framework in this paper is that it allows us to derive the familiar first order 
conditions of profit maximization that can be used to infer how political and military manpower 
institutions can affect military capital intensity, which in turn can affect the total number of 
casualties in military conflicts. 
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2.4 Four Theoretical Scenarios 
SCENARIO 1: DICTATORSHIP WITH VOLUNTEER ARMY 
Consider the first scenario where the assumed hypothetical country is a dictatorship with a 
volunteer army. There are still countries like Cameroon, Rwanda, and Uganda, for example, with 
very low democracy scores and heavy reliance on volunteer armed forces. While this scenario is 
not the most common around the world, theoretically it is the simplest case to begin with. A 
dictator chooses the profit maximizing level of fighting effort or output in a given conflict with a 
given payoff pDic, enemy resistance effort YE, volunteer wage wV, and capital rent r.   
             (1.1) 
LK
Max
,
LwrKYYQp VEDicDicV −−= ),( π
Where  is the general form CSF, Y=F(A, K, L) and Y),( EYYQ E=FE(AE, KE, LE) are the 
respective fighting effort or production functions of the two contesting parties, L and K are labor 
and capital. From now on forward assume that 0,0,0,0 ≤>≤> KKKLLL FFFF .  
It can be shown that taking the first order conditions for equation (1.1) yields the 
conventional microeconomic result where the ratio of the marginal product of labor and capital 
equals to the wage to rent ratio as shown in equation (1.2).  
 
r
wV 
F
F
K
L =                (1.2) 
The wage to rent ratio shows how valuable is one input relative to another. If military volunteers 
are relatively more expensive compared to military capital (weapons), then this army would have 
fewer soldiers and more military capital than the army with less expensive volunteers, ceteris 
paribus. A country with relatively more abundant capital and relatively scarce labor force would 
value labor more and capital less, resulting in a more capital intensive military. Total combat 
casualties would then depend on the amount of labor input used in a given combat for a given 
level of capital, technology, and some constant exogenous casualty (depreciation) rate. Thus, a 
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more labor intensive military would be expected to suffer more total combat casualties compared 
to a less labor intensive military, holding everything else equal. This is how the relative value of 
life in military conflicts is determined by military capital intensity, which is determined by the 
relative price of labor. 
 
SCENARIO 2: DICTATORSHIP WITH CONSCRIPTION ARMY 
Consider the second scenario where the same hypothetical country is still a dictatorship, but with 
a conscription army. This dictator chooses the profit maximizing level of fighting effort or output 
in a given conflict for a given payoff pDic, enemy resistance effort YE, conscription wage wC, and 
capital rent r. All other variables defined as previously.   
             (2.1) 
LK
Max
,
LwrKYYQp CEDicDicC −−= ),( π
Conscription places an indirect tax on draftees by forcing them to work for a lower wage 
than they would have chosen voluntarily. Hence, conscripts will be paid some wage that is less 
then the wage paid in a volunteer army in the first scenario by some constant ε > 0, such that 
. The dictator’s objective, then, is to draft the warfare profit maximizing level of 
labor at the conscription wage  and to buy the optimal level of capital at the competitive 
market price r. The first order conditions for this scenario yield the marginal products ratio that 
equals to the ratio of factor prices as shown in equation (2.2).  
ε−= VC ww
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L               (2.2) 
With the conscription wage being lower the volunteer wage, the dictator in this scenario finds it 
optimal to hire more military personnel or soldiers than he would in the first scenario with 
volunteer based army. The total level of combat casualties would then be higher in the second 
scenario than in the first. Therefore, the total level of casualties under a conscription army is 
expected to be higher than under a volunteer army, ceteris paribus. Thus, the wage to rental ratio 
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in equation (2.2) tells us that dictatorship with volunteer army would value life more and suffer 
fewer casualties in a given conflict than its “twin” regime with conscription army.  
 
SCENARIO 3: DEMOCRACY WITH VOLUNTEER ARMY 
Consider the third case scenario where the same hypothetical country has a democracy with a 
volunteer army. The democratically elected leader chooses the profit maximizing level of 
warfare output in a given conflict for a given payoff pDem, enemy resistance YE, volunteer wage 
wV, and capital rent r. The profit function in this representative democracy, however, is a little 
different from the two dictatorship scenarios analyzed earlier. Unlike dictatorship, democracy is 
governed by the agent that is elected to represent the preferences of his or her constituents. 
Therefore, this agent has to maximize warfare profit on the behalf of the median voter and 
his/her perceived share of conflict payoff pDem and external conflict cost C.  
The interesting thing about conflict payoff pDem under democracy is that the larger the 
country the smaller is the share of payoff pDem that the median voter gets from a conflict. 
Arguably, the same concept could also apply to the external conflict cost C perceived by the 
median voter. If conflict payoff pDem is really small under democracies, then democracies would 
find it profitable to fight only the wars with much higher total payoffs compared to dictatorships. 
In other words, democracies should be more picky about who they fight, which agrees with 
Filson and Werner (2004). However, if C is also very small, then warfare incentives for a 
democracy could be similar to those for a dictatorship. 
Another interesting point can be made by assuming that the payoff from a given conflict 
is like a public good, meaning that the share of payoff pDem that the median voter gets from a 
conflict is one and the same as the total conflict payoff. This could explain why democracies are 
more likely to go to war with non-democracies if fighting non-democracies results in the payoff 
with public good characteristics like giving freedom to the oppressed people, for example.  
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It is also reasonable to assume that civilian citizens care about how many of their 
countrymen fight and get killed or wounded in a given conflict. They might also care about their 
country’s image, which could depend on how successfully the warfare is being conducted or 
what combat strategies are being used (Consider civilian or carpet bombing used in Vietnam, for 
example). Thus, in general, external conflict cost C could take the form of financial as well as 
emotional costs associated with losing one’s family or friends, tarnished national image, etc. The 
external conflict cost C is modeled as a linear function of combat casualties, which depend on 
the amount of military personnel used in warfare and the degree of battlefield success reflected 
in the CSF. In other words, the external cost function is linked to casualties that are, in turn, 
linked to the relative war success and size of combat troops. Higher casualties mean higher 
external cost of conflict. 
The objective function for this democracy with volunteer army is to maximize warfare 
profit with respect to labor and capital as shown in equation (3.1). 
         (3.1) 
LK
Max
,
)),(,(),( EVEDemDemV YYQLCLwrKYYQp −−−=π
All variables are defined as previously. The first order conditions for this democracy with a 
volunteer army yield the marginal products ratio in equation (3.2) that shows what costs are 
considered in choosing the profit maximizing combinations of labor and capital. 
 
r
Cw L
V += 
F
F
K
L               (3.2) 
In this scenario, the marginal products ratio in equation (3.2) equals the volunteer wage rate  
plus the marginal external conflict cost C
Vw
L divided by the rental rate r.3 Comparing this scenario 
to the previous two scenarios with dictatorship reveals that democracy with a volunteer army 
places the highest relative value on labor because it internalizes the marginal external conflict 
cost CL perceived by the median voter. By internalizing both private and external costs of 
                                                 
3 Assume that C is well behaved and CL > 0, CLL ≤ 0. 
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warfare, democracy with volunteer army faces a higher cost of military personnel relative to 
military capital. Thus, it is economically optimal for democracies to go to wars with more capital 
intensive forces compared to dictatorships, ceteris paribus. This implies that democracy is 
expected to value life more and suffer fewer combat casualties as a result. 
 
SCENARIO 4: DEMOCRACY WITH CONSCRIPTION ARMY 
Now, consider the last scenario where the same hypothetical country is still a democracy, but 
with a conscription army. A democratically elected leader in representative democracy has to 
abide by the payoff pDem and the external conflict cost C as perceived by the median voter. 
Having a conscription army, on the other hand, places an indirect tax burden on the draftees in 
terms of below the market (if any) wages. Israel is a good example of this case. Israel, while a 
democracy, relies heavily on conscription. 
The democracy with a conscription army chooses war profit maximizing levels of labor 
and capital. All variables are defined as previously. 
           (4.1) 
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The first order conditions yield the following marginal products ratio. 
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Equation (4.2) shows that democracy with a conscription army faces a lower military personnel 
cost resulting in less capital intensive military compared to its democratic counterpart with 
volunteer army. Hence, as has been shown previously, conscription would reduce the value of 
life in military conflicts and increase total combat casualties. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results from the four scenarios by comparing the factor 
payments ratios from the first order conditions of profit maximization. The factor payments 
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ratios listed in Table 2.1 show elegantly how different political regimes and military recruitment 
institutions considered in this paper affect the relative value of life in military conflicts. 
Table 2.1 
Marginal Products Ratios from Four Scenarios 
 
Volunteer Army Conscription Army 
Democracy 
r
Cw L
V +  
r
Cw L
V +−ε  
Dictatorship 
r
wV  
r
wV ε−  
 
It is clear from Table 2.1 that democracy with a volunteer army places the highest relative 
value on its military personnel (and on their lives consequently) compared to any other scenario 
in the paper. This result occurs because of the belief that representative democracy reflects the 
preferences of its constituents, thereby internalizing the external costs of war being reflected in 
the preferences of the median voter. In addition to that, Table 2.1 shows that a volunteer army 
increases the relative value of military personnel because volunteers earn a competitively 
determined wage rate that accounts for the private costs of war much better than the lower 
conscription wage rate. The interesting case to consider, however, is whether democracy with 
conscription army values life more than dictatorship with volunteer army. Depending on the 
values of ε and CL, either democracy with conscription army or dictatorship with volunteer army 
may claim the second highest value of life among the four scenarios considered in this paper. 
Without knowing the values of ε and CL, the difference between these two regimes is 
theoretically ambiguous and should be resolved only empirically. Finally, dictatorship with 
conscription army places the lowest value on life because this dictatorship does not account 
completely for either the private or external cost of a conflict in choosing the profit maximizing 
combination of inputs. 
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While the derived marginal products ratios offer elegant analytical conclusions about the 
role of political regimes and military manpower systems in the valuation of military personnel 
and resulting combat casualties, the real world is too complex to be fully captured by this model. 
Nevertheless, this model should be able to capture the main determinants of combat casualties. 
This claim would have to be examined empirically.   
 
2.5 Empirical Analysis and Results 
As summarized in Table 2.1, democracies with volunteer armies face a higher value (cost) of 
military personnel, which forces them to create a more capital intensive military force compared 
to dictatorships with conscription armies.  A more capital intensive military force is likely to 
suffer fewer battlefield casualties compared to a less capital intensive military force, everything 
else being equal. The proposition that democratic regimes and volunteer armies lead to lower 
combat casualties can be turned into empirically testable hypotheses:  
Ho 1. More democratic nations experience lower battlefield deaths. 
Ho 2. Heavier conscription reliance leads to higher battlefield deaths. 
Testing the above hypotheses by simply regressing battlefield casualties on democracy, 
conscription, and some control variables may prove to be a very ad-hoc and unsound approach. 
The theoretical model in this paper says that democracy and conscription affect battlefield 
casualties indirectly via military capital intensity. Moreover, a single-stage regression without 
addressing the endogenous nature of some explanatory variables can significantly bias the 
estimates. A two stage least squares with instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) estimation technique 
would be preferred, a priori. 
There are two data samples used in this paper. The first sample (called pooled) is based 
on the data for specific conflicts and their country participants. This sample amounts to, at most, 
311 observations and features interstate, civil, and extra systemic conflicts. There could be 
 19
 
several observations in this sample for the same conflict but different country participants. In the 
case of civil wars, there is only one observation entry for each country experiencing a civil war. 
The second sample is based on cross-country averages (84 countries) and their battlefield deaths 
in the conflicts during the 1950-2002 period. The cross-country regressions should capture the 
long-run determinants of combat casualties, while the pooled sample regressions should capture 
the short-run determinants and idiosyncrasies of battlefield casualties. Table A.9 lists the 
conflicts featured in the pooled sample, while Table A.10 lists countries featured in the cross-
country sample. An unfortunate constraint for these samples, however, is the limited availability 
of conscription and economic freedom data. Introducing conscription and economic freedom4 
variables into regression reduces the sample size to 169 and 75 observations, respectively, for the 
two samples. 
The following structural form system of equations will be estimated using 2SLS-IV 
estimator in accordance with the theoretical model where political regimes and military 
manpower systems affect military’s capital-labor ratio, which affects the total size of combat 
casualties. In other words, military capital intensity (proxied by military expenditures divided by 
military personnel) should be endogenous in democracy, conscription, and country’s relative 
capital abundance (proxied by real GDP per capita) that are used as instruments in the first-stage 
regression shown in equation (5.1).  
 
itit
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4 There are additional limitations with FREEDOM and CONSC variables. Because conscription and economic 
freedom indexes come mostly in 5-year intervals it is difficult to match them precisely to some conflicts. See the 
appendix for more information on this issue. 
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In turn, military capital intensity together with conflict duration, conflict type, and national 
capability to conduct warfare can affect the total number of battlefield deaths that would have to 
be estimated in the second-stage regression as shown in equation (5.2). 
    (5.2) 
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Where ME/PERSONNEL is military expenditures per military personnel in country i in the first 
year t5 of conflict j, DEMOCRACY is a nation’s democracy score in the first year of conflict, 
CONSC is the index of conscription reliance, FREEDOM6 is the index of economic freedom, 
GDP/CAPITA is real GDP per capita in the first year of conflict, DEATHS is the total number of 
battlefield deaths incurred by country i during conflict j, DURATION measures conflict duration 
in calendar years, CAPABILITY is the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) in the 
first year of conflict, CIVIL is the dummy variable specifying conflict type (civil war), and 
UPOP is the size of urban population in the first year of conflict.  Data on battlefield deaths, 
conflict type, and conflict intensity come from Gleditsch et al. (2002) made available by Uppsala 
University and the Peace Research Institute at Oslo (PRIO). Please look in the appendix for a 
more detailed description of variables and data sources.  
There are four variables of primary interest in this paper’s regression analysis: 
democracy, conscription, economic freedom, and military capital intensity. The first-stage 
regression estimates would show if democracy, conscription, and economic freedom variables 
are significant determinants of military capital intensity. The economic freedom variable is 
included here to control for the potentially important influence of free markets on battlefield 
deaths since Gartzke (2005) found it to be an important determinant of peace. A free market 
would allow an unconstrained flow of resources (labor and capital) to their most highly valued 
                                                 
5 To avoid capturing the influence of warfare on some independent variables, I only use the first year of conflict 
values of these variables. 
6 Conscription is one of the components in the economic freedom index. Thus, the FREEDOM variable that is used 
in this paper is the economic freedom index net of conscription (courtesy of Robert Lawson).  
 21
 
usage. Thus, one would expect that the risk premium on serving in the army would be fully 
realized in the free market economy making labor relatively more expensive than capital. The 
estimate for military capital intensity in the second-stage regression would, in turn, show how 
capital to labor ratio affects battlefield deaths. Other independent variables function as control or 
instrumental variables for ME/PERSONNEL in equation (5.1). The conflict duration variable 
controls for the size of casualties. Variables like national military capability (CINC) and urban 
population may capture nation’s natural resource, technological, and human capital capabilities, 
while real GDP per capita captures country’s capital abundance per worker.  
I first run single-stage regressions as a robustness check and test for model’s 
specification. The first regression shown in Table A.4 is applied to the individual conflict 
(pooled) sample and performs a version of the so called robust regression that weighs 
observations to reduce the outlier bias in coefficient and error estimates. The list of explanatory 
variables in this robust single-stage regression consists of democracy, economic freedom, 
conscription, real GDP per capita7, national military capability (CINC), civil war dummy, and 
military capital intensity (i.e. military expenditure per military personnel). The dependent 
variable is average annual battlefield deaths calculated as the best available estimate of a nation’s 
battlefield deaths in a given conflict divided by its duration (in years). The regression estimates 
for the pooled sample show that democracy, economic freedom, and real GDP per capita are 
negatively related to battlefield deaths, while conscription, capability, civil war, and military 
capital intensity are positively related to battlefield deaths. However, only economic freedom, 
real GDP per capita, conscription, capability, and civil war are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
[Table A.4 about here] 
                                                 
7 Regression diagnostics show a high level of correlation (see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix) between 
democracy, economic freedom, and real GDP per capita. Therefore, a residual obtained from regressing real 
GDP/capita on democracy and economic freedom is used in all regressions instead of the original real GDP/capita 
variable. 
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Since battlefield deaths vary widely across conflicts and country participants, we may 
expect more reliable and insightful estimates based on cross-country long term averages. The 
next robust regression (Table A.4) fits the same model and yields, at times, very different 
estimates compared to the pooled regression. Democracy, conscription, real GDP per capita, civil 
war, and military capital intensity are now negatively related to battlefield deaths, while 
economic freedom and capability are positively related to battlefield deaths. Only democracy, 
capability, and civil war are statistically significant at the 5% level. Clearly, the estimates are not 
very consistent across the two different samples. The specification (link) and omitted variable 
bias tests shown in Table A.5 indicate that the single-stage regression for the pooled sample is 
miss-specified, but the cross-country based regression is not.  
[Table A.5 about here] 
More importantly, the exogenous specification of military capital intensity is rejected by 
the Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests shown in Table A.6. These tests 
suggest that the 2SLS-IV estimator is more appropriate in this case. 
[Table A.6 about here] 
There are five 2SLS-IV regressions based on the pooled sample shown in Table A.7. All 
of them use battlefield deaths as the dependent variable, which is sometimes normalized 
(divided) by military personnel or years of conflict to check for robustness of regression results. 
The first-stage estimates in regression (1) in Table A.7 show that democracy and real GDP per 
capita are positively and significantly related to military capital intensity. This regression utilizes 
the entire sample size of 311 observations. Including economic freedom and conscription 
variables, however, reduces the sample size to 169 observations and makes the democracy 
coefficient negative but not statistical significant. Economic freedom and real GDP per capita 
turn out to be positively and significantly related to military capital intensity in regression (2), 
while conscription appears significantly but negatively related to military capital intensity. The 
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other independent variables like capability, conflict duration, and urban population are also 
statistically significant in the first stages of regressions (1) and (2). Capability index (CINC) is 
negatively related to military capital intensity, perhaps, suggesting that countries with a strong 
national military capability do not have to rely as much on capital intensive militaries for defense 
as less resource abundant nations do. Urban population is positively related to military capital 
intensity, perhaps capturing a higher human capital and economic development effect. In turn, 
the negative effect of duration on military capital intensity could capture the resource (capital) 
depleting effect of warfare. 
 [Table A.7 about here] 
The second-stage regression estimates in regressions (1) and (2) shown in Table A.7 
indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between total battlefield deaths and 
(predicted) military capital intensity. This relationship captures the main point of my argument 
that political and military manpower institutions affect conflict casualties through military capital 
intensity. Conflict duration is significantly and positively (naturally) related to battlefield deaths, 
while urban population is weakly significant and negatively related to battlefield deaths. 
Looking at 2SLS-IV regression (1) and (2) estimates in Table A.7, it may seem that 
democracy loses its significance after controlling for economic freedom and conscription. 
However, I argue that this would be a hasty conclusion that neglects the potential presence of 
outliers, sample bias, and non-normality of errors. To address these problems, I use robust and 
median 2SLS-IV regressions. The median regression decreases the potential outlier effect that 
could bias the estimates, while the weighted robust regression adjusts for the frequency of same 
country observations appearing in the data sample. 8 As seen in Table A.7, the 2SLS-IV models 
                                                 
8 These robust regressions take the inverse of the probability that the observation is included in the dataset. The 
sample weighted robust regressions produce similar estimates as the reported simple robust regressions. Robust 
regressions also allow for the non-normality of errors and produce heteroskedasticity and outlier resistant coefficient 
estimates and standard errors. 
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estimated using robust and median estimators yield significant and consistently signed estimates 
for democracy, economic freedom, conscription, and real GDP per capita. 
Similarly to the first two regressions in Table A.7, the second-stage estimates from robust 
and median regressions support the main claim that military capital intensity is negatively related 
to battlefield deaths. The second-stage estimates for military capital intensity in regression (2) 
show that a one time raise in the average expenditure per military personnel by $1,000 would 
save about 70 lives on average in a given conflict. For a numerically large army, this would be a 
prohibitively expensive life-saving policy. The other variables like capability, conflict duration, 
and civil war dummy appear statistically significant in both robust and median regressions. 
Conflict duration coefficient is negative in the robust regression (3) and positive in the median 
regression (4). Capability index (CINC), on the other hand is positively related to battlefield 
deaths, which might seem counterintuitive at first. However, I interpret the positive sign as an 
indication that countries with larger natural capabilities are perhaps capable of fighting more 
intensive and prolonged wars. Conversely, this positive relationship could capture the reverse 
causality effect in which warfare needs raise military expenditure and consumption of some 
natural resources that make up this capability index (CINC). The end result is higher battlefield 
deaths. 
Another way to check for the robustness of my findings is to normalize the dependent 
variable. This procedure might be better suited for capturing the determinants of relative 
battlefield deaths rather than the total conflict size as proxied by total battlefield deaths. To 
normalize the dependent variable, I divide it by total military personnel, total population, total 
urban population, or years of conflict duration. Table A.7 reports only the estimates for the 
regressions with the dependent variable divided by total military personnel. The normalized 
 25
 
median regression results confirm the previous findings.9 The first-stage estimates from the 
normalized median regression (5) are the same as those in the median regression (4). The 
second-stage regression results are a little different, however. In regression (5), urban population 
and conflict duration are highly significant, while capability is not. Most importantly, military 
capital intensity remains highly significant. The interesting point of these estimates is that 
democracy and conscription remain significant even after controlling for economic freedom and 
per capita GDP. This evidence supports the view that political institutions matter even after 
controlling for economic factors. However, similar to Gartzke (2005), I find that economic 
freedom has a much stronger effect (as much as 13 times) than democracy  on military capital 
intensity. 
Another way to check for the robustness of my findings is to run the same regressions on 
the cross-country averages of battlefield deaths. These regressions should pick up the long-run 
determinants of the average conflict casualties. I first run the 2SLS-IV regression without the 
economic freedom and conscription variables. Then, I include these two variables in the 
conventional 2SLS-IV regressions estimated using robust and median techniques. The regression 
results reported in Table A.8 are similar to those reported in Table A.7. Namely, all regressions 
in Table A.8 consistently show that democracy, economic freedom, and real GDP per capita are 
positively and significantly related to military capital intensity, which in return is negatively and 
significantly related to battlefield casualties. As expected, conscription is negatively and 
significantly related to military capital intensity in all regressions. Conversely, conflict duration 
and capability turn out statistically significant more consistently compared to the short-run 
estimates in Table A.7. Otherwise, the long-run findings with respect to the main four variables 
appear to be very robust across different estimation techniques and dependent variables (i.e. 
                                                 
9 Robust and median regressions with the dependent variable normalized by total population, urban population, and 
conflict duration produce similar results. 
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normalized or not). The tests for the validity of instruments (see Hansen J statistic in Table A.7 
and A.8) used in 2SLS-IV regressions show that democracy, economic freedom, conscription, 
and real GDP per capita cannot be rejected as instruments. This evidence provides strong support 
for the proposed hypotheses.  
[Table A.8 about here] 
One of the most interesting or intriguing findings is the apparent convergence in the 
magnitudes of the coefficients for democracy (increase) and economic freedom (decrease) in the 
long-run. For example, the coefficient for economic freedom could be 13 times as large as the 
coefficient for democracy in raising military capital intensity in the short-run. In the long-run 
however, the difference between these coefficients decreases dramatically. While economic 
freedom remains more potent than democracy in raising military capital intensity even in the 
long-run, the estimates suggest that political and economic freedoms must converge over time in 
their effects on military capital intensity. Also, the coefficients for the military capital intensity in 
regression (7) indicate that a one time raise of $1,000 in the average expenditure per military 
personnel could save about 130 lives annually in an average conflict. These are much higher 
coefficients compared to the short-run coefficient estimates shown in Table A.7. 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Using warfare profit maximization as a theoretical framework, I show how different political 
regimes (democracy vs. dictatorship) and military manpower systems (volunteer vs. 
conscription) could affect military capital intensity, value of life, and subsequent combat 
casualties. The model shows that democracy with volunteer army values life the highest, while 
dictatorship with conscription army values life the lowest. The theoretically ambiguous result 
occurs when comparing the value of life under democracy with conscription army to that under 
dictatorship with volunteer army. Which political regime values life more in these two cases 
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depends on how low the conscription wage compared to the external cost of conflict perceived 
by the median voter. 
The empirical estimates obtained in this paper provide strong support for the model’s 
predictions that more democratic regimes and more reliance on volunteer armies (or economic 
freedom in general) lead to higher capital intensity of military forces and lower combat 
casualties. These findings provide further support for the notion that democratic and free market 
nations try to avoid large (costly) military conflicts and suffer fewer combat casualties than less 
democratic and market friendly nations. It is also worth noting that economic freedom appears to 
be a more robust and potent (as much as 13 times more potent) determinant of military capital 
intensity and battlefield deaths than democracy. One of the interesting findings in this paper is 
that the effects of democracy and economic freedom on military capital intensity are closer 
together in the average cross-country regressions than in the individual (pooled) conflict 
regressions. This suggests some convergence in the effect of economic and political freedoms on 
military capital intensity in the long-run. 
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 Chapter 3 
Military Expenditure, Arms Trade, and Economic Growth 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Some people associate military expenditure with a guarantee of peace and security, yet others see 
it as a wasteful enterprise potentially resulting in arms races or direct military confrontation. 
Regardless of one’s perspective, arms trade and production is a big business with nontrivial 
economic consequences. According to the latest SIPRI estimates, world military expenditure 
amounted to $975 billion in 2004 (constant prices), or $162 of military spending per capita and 
2.6 percent of world GDP. The United States, for example, is the major determinant of the world 
trend in military expenditure with its 47 percent share. Some of the biggest military spenders in 
the word are also some of the biggest arms traders. Russia, for instance, established itself as the 
main supplier of conventional weapons during 2000–2004 replacing the United States, the 
largest supplier for many years. France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the USA were 
responsible for 81 percent of all arms deliveries during 2000–2004. The SIPRI estimates also 
show that the combined arms deliveries of all 25 EU states to non-EU states made up about 19 
percent of all arms deliveries in 2000–2004, making the EU the third largest arms exporter. The 
world arms trade rose to $51.6 billion in 1999 with developing countries now capturing the 
bigger share of arms trade, thereby reversing the previous trend. Developed nations accounted 
for 96 percent of total arms exports in 1999 compared to 92 percent a decade earlier. 
These figures highlight the economic significance of the military sector and raise 
questions about the likely economic impacts of military expenditure and arms trade. One of the 
most relevant and researched issues is the relationship between economic growth and military 
expenditure. However, the empirical estimates of this relationship are contradictory or 
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inconclusive. Some of this confusion might be due to the non-linear relationship between growth 
and military expenditure or incorrectly specified models. Dunne et al. (2005) point out that the 
identification (i.e. reverse causality) issues in the defense-growth nexus and the sensitivity of 
small deviations in military expenditures to estimation techniques plague the estimates in many 
empirical studies. Aizenman and Glick (2003) argue that linear empirical models lead to 
inconsistent results when the relationship between economic growth and defense spending is 
non-linear, which is what they find to be the case. Taking these arguments into consideration, I 
examine the growth effects of military expenditure, arms trade, and their interactions using a 
balanced panel data for 28 countries from 1965 to 2000. Using fixed effects, random effects, and 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimators, I investigate the non-linear effect of military spending on 
economic growth in the Solow and Barro style regressions. Controlling for panel-level 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems that typically plague panel data estimation, I 
find that the augmented Solow growth model described by Dunne et al. (2005) performs more 
robustly across different estimators than the reformulated Barro growth model. The estimates 
indicate a significant non-linear relationship between growth and military spending, being 
conditional on net arms exports. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
This section provides a brief review of the commonly referred channels through which military 
spending and arms trade may influence economic growth. Whereas Smith (2000) and Dunne 
(1996) offer a more detailed description of the various channels of influence from military 
spending, I shall provide only a brief summary of these channels. The defense-growth literature 
has accumulated a large number of papers analyzing a wide variety of different channels through 
which military expenditure may influence growth. These channels can be broadly grouped into 
three major categories as done by Dunne et al. (2005): demand, supply, and security channels.  
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In the demand channel, military spending works through the Keynesian multiplier effect 
that depends on the level and composition of military expenditure. According to this channel, 
additional military spending increases aggregate demand in the presence of spare capacity, which 
reduces unemployment and increases capital utilization. Hence, military spending is often seen 
as having a growth enhancing effect in this specification. In many developing countries, military 
spending might be seen as being capable of enhancing social infrastructure (roads, 
communication networks, etc.) and human capital (military education and training) that are likely 
to contribute to future economic growth. However, military spending has an opportunity cost and 
may crowd out investment in human and physical capital. The extent and form of this crowding-
out, as pointed out by Dunne et al. (2005), depends on prior utilization of resources and how the 
increase in military spending is financed. A constrained government budget requires that an 
increase in military expenditure must be financed by budget cuts in other government programs, 
higher taxes, higher debt, greater money supply, or some combination of these methods. 
Different ways of financing an additional military expenditure might, obviously, have different 
effects on output and growth. Moreover, a change in military expenditure may change the 
composition of industrial output through input–output effects, according to Dunne et al. (2005). 
Clearly, it may not be possible to deduce whether the net effect of higher military spending on 
output and growth is positive or negative in this demand channel specification.  
In the supply channel, the military sector competes with the civilian sector for labor, 
physical capital, human capital, natural resources and, perhaps, technology. The resources used 
by the military are not available for civilian use; hence, the opportunity cost of military spending. 
Mylonidis (2006) lists a number of opportunity costs associated with a higher military burden 
that include: crowded-out public and private investment, adverse balance of payments in arms 
importing countries, inefficient bureaucracies (i.e. extensive rent seeking), fewer civilian public 
sector services, depleted R&D activities, and skilled workforce in the civilian sector. On the 
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other hand, it can be argued that military R&D spending can result in the development of new 
technology (i.e. radar, jet engine, nuclear energy) that can spill over into the civilian (private) 
sector. Dunne et al. (2005) point out that training in the armed forces can make workers more or 
less productive when they return to civilian employment, while military R&D may lead to 
commercial spin-offs. Some proponents of military spending argue that some research projects 
will not be carried out in the private sector due to the high-risk environment and public-good 
characteristics of the final product. If this is true, then military R&D can be a net producer of 
positive technological externalities. To complicate things further, consider the argument by 
Stroup and Heckelman (2001) that the net effect of military spending on growth is described by a 
non-linear, concave function if the military sector exhibits diminishing marginal productivity. 
This argument implies that at low levels of military spending the net effect on growth is positive, 
but after a certain maximum point, growth declines as military spending continues to expand and 
may even become negative. Moreover, Dunne et al. (2005) state that conscription and ideological 
fervor may increase the mobilization of factors of production, particularly during times of a 
perceived threat of war, potentially leading to greater output if these mobilized resources are not 
used exclusively for military purposes. In other words, mobilization efforts could have, at best, a 
positive effect on growth in the short run.  
In the case of the security channel, the provision of national defense fosters the security 
of persons and property rights from domestic or foreign threats, which is essential to the 
operation of markets and to the incentives to invest and innovate. This is a very old argument 
dating back to Adam Smith, who noted that the first two duties of the state were to protect its 
citizens from foreign and domestic oppression or violence. It has been often noted in the 
literature that wars and a lack of security are major obstacles to development in many poor 
countries. Defense expenditures, thus, can strengthen the incentives to accumulate capital and 
produce more output, leading to higher economic growth (Thompson, 1974).  However, when 
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military expenditures are not driven by basic security needs and are due to the rent-seeking 
activities, military expenditures may provoke arms races or damaging wars. Supportive of this 
argument is Aizenman and Glick’s (2003) finding, indicating that economic growth increases 
with higher military spending when a country faces higher military threats, and that economic 
growth decreases with higher military spending when a country experiences high levels of 
corruption. In this case, less military spending would be desirable and could lead to positive 
security effects on economic growth. For instance, the disarmament process and dramatic cuts in 
defense budgets in many countries following the end of the Cold War have often been credited 
with generating the so called “peace dividend” that resulted in better standards of living.  
Likewise, arms trade may affect economic growth through a number of different 
channels, and in a non-linear way, through an interaction with military expenditure similar to the 
interaction between military spending and threats examined by Aizenman and Glick (2003). It 
might be more insightful to examine arms exports and arms imports separately in order to 
identify more accurately the channels through which they may impact growth. In the case of 
arms imports, a component of military spending has to be allocated to pay for these purchases. 
Arms purchases are not cheap, and some countries have to resort to external borrowing in order 
to pay for their arms imports or some portion of their military budget in general. Of course, 
foreign borrowing does not necessarily lead to slower economic growth. In fact, reasonable 
levels of foreign borrowing might even stimulate growth. Dunne et al. (2003) suggest that, in 
evaluating the impact of debt on growth, it is important to consider how the external debt is 
being used. If it is used to increase productive capacity, external borrowing may even facilitate 
development. However, if the scarce foreign exchange resources are spent on arms imports 
instead of investment goods that are essential for self-sustaining growth, then the effect of 
external borrowing on growth is likely to be negative. Looney (1989) investigates how military 
expenditures and arms imports affect debt in resource-constrained countries and unconstrained 
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countries and finds arms imports to be a significant contributor to Third World indebtedness. In 
another empirical study, Looney and Frederiksen (1986) find that the unconstrained developing 
countries are able to support higher level of arms imports. Gunluk-Senesen and Sezgin (2002) 
find that the growth in arms imports has a significant positive effect on external debt, while no 
such effect is found for the growth in military spending.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that arms imports may help the importing countries 
to acquire new technology through reverse engineering or through the necessary training of 
military personnel required for operating high-tech weapons systems. In some instances, arms 
imports may result in direct technological transfers when they take the form of a licensed 
production of military weapons or some of their parts. India and Russia, for instance, signed a 
major defense deal for the purchase of 310 new Russian T-90 main battle tanks and their 
production under a Russian license in India. This agreement allows India to manufacture some 
critical components of the T-90 tanks. Between 1993 and 2005, China acquired the rights to 
produce 200 SU-27 and 250 SU-30 fighters domestically under a Russian license. This tendency 
toward more licensed production, rather than finished arms imports, is becoming more and more 
prevalent in international arms trade, which has become increasingly competitive in the last 
decade or so. In light of this tendency, it would be worthwhile to hypothesize about the reasons 
that governments have for preferring domestic production of arms instead of arms imports. At 
least three arguments come to mind. First, some countries may find themselves at risk when their 
defense capabilities depend on the supply of arms from other countries, especially from potential 
enemies. Second, some governments may believe that relying on arms imports instead of 
producing arms domestically is economically wasteful. Finally, arms imports might be very 
difficult to justify politically in election campaigns. Thus, arms exports could be considered 
beneficial, and arms imports detrimental, to the economy. Hence, the purpose of this study: to 
find out if there is a systematic relationship between arms trade and economic growth for a given 
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level of military expenditure. In other words, would the evidence support the argument that arms 
imports are necessarily detrimental to growth, and that arms exports, by reverse logic, are 
necessarily beneficial for growth?  
While this question will be rigorously explored in the empirical section of this paper, 
some obvious correlations are already clear. Between 2000 and 2004, according to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the top ten suppliers of arms in the 
world were Russia, USA, France, Germany, UK, Ukraine, Canada, China, Sweden, and Israel 
(descending order). Also, the SIPRI records show that the world’s top military spenders in total 
dollar value in 2004 were USA, UK, France, Japan, China, Germany, Italy, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, and South Korea. Clearly, the majority of these countries are not only some of the 
biggest military spenders but also some of the biggest arms exporters. Moreover, the majority of 
these countries, with the exception of current and former planned economies, are developed 
countries. According to the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report, 
developed countries were overall net arms exporters in every year between 1989 and 1999 (see 
Figure A.1), as well as in the decade before that, which implies that developing countries were 
net arms importers over the same period. These casual observations suggest that arms trade 
patterns are correlated with military expenditures and the level of economic development. 
Perhaps whether or not a country is a net arms exporter depends on the level of military spending 
and technology that, in turn, could be affected by the level of economic development. Relevant 
to this idea is the finding by Goldsmith (2003) that economic growth, per capita income, and 
democracy are among the significant determinants of military spending. It is possible that arms 
exports depend on a country’s technological progress and income. Thus, it is also possible that 
arms exports could proxy for spill-over effects or positive technological externalities stemming 
from military R&D.  
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As is the case with military spending, the net effect of net arms exports is ambiguous in 
theory and would ultimately have to be examined empirically. It is difficult to hypothesize about 
the direction of the net effect, given that there is a plethora of channels through which military 
spending and arms trade could impact economic growth. Since it is impossible to incorporate all 
the significant linkages from military spending within one model, researchers often choose to 
focus on cross-country growth models.  They neglect these complex linkages in favor of a simple 
reduced form relationship between output and military spending state Dunne et al. (2005). The 
result of this approach is a variety of diverging empirical findings on the defense-growth nexus, 
which is not surprising considering the diversity of models, econometric techniques, time 
periods, and country samples used. Some of these contradictory findings are due to the severe 
econometric and theoretical problems of the Feder-Ram model (Ram, 1995), as Dunne et al. 
(2005) argue. Moreover, they conclude that the Feder-Ram model should be abandoned in favor 
of the conventional Barro or Solow growth models, which are better suited for analyzing the 
defense-growth relationship. Following their advice, I proceed to analyze the relationship 
between growth and military spending and arms trade within the context of the two commonly 
used Barro and Solow growth models. 
 
3.3 The Augmented Solow Growth Model 
In 1956, Robert Solow developed a model that revolutionized the study of economic growth. He 
assumed an economy with a standard Cobb-Douglass production function, with decreasing 
marginal returns to capital and a fixed level of technology. The textbook Solow growth model 
treats the rate of saving, population growth, and technological progress as exogenous. The model 
predicts that “poorer” countries should be able to grow at faster rates than “richer” countries, 
thereby leading to cross-country convergence, albeit a conditional one, in the standards of living 
over time. In their influential paper, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) augmented the textbook 
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Solow growth model with human capital. They showed that it could explain as much as eighty 
percent of cross-country variation in output per worker, and that it could approximately predict 
cross-country convergence in the standards of living. A variant of the augmented Solow growth 
model was used by Knight et al. (1996) and Dunne et al. (2004) in estimating the effect of 
military expenditure on growth.  
The effect of military spending on growth could be modeled in a number of ways. One 
way is to assume that military spending (as a share of aggregate output) affects factor 
productivity via a level effect on the efficiency parameter that controls labor-augmenting 
technical change, as shown by Dunne et al. (2005). To see this, consider the aggregate 
neoclassical production function, now featuring the labor-augmenting technological progress 
with human capital following Mankiw et al. (1992): 
βαβα −−= 1)]()([)()()( tLtAtHtKtY ,              (1) 
where Y denotes aggregate real income, H is the human capital stock, K is the real capital stock, 
L is labor, and A is the technology parameter. Technology parameter A evolves according to: 
θ)()( 0 tmeAtA
gt= ,                  (2) 
where g is the exogenous rate of Harrod-neutral technological progress and m is the share of 
military spending in aggregate output. According to this specification by Dunne et al. (2005), a 
permanent change in military spending share does not affect the long-run steady-state growth 
rate, but it might have a permanent level effect on per-capita income along the steady-state 
growth path. Military spending (m) also can affect transitory growth rates along the path to the 
new steady-state equilibrium. Provided with this specification, one could estimate the influence 
of military spending on growth using panel-level data as was done by Dunne et al. (2004).  
Continuing with a concise exposition of this model, one can now observe some of its 
dynamic properties. Given the standard assumptions of an exogenous saving rate s, a constant 
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labor force growth rate n and capital depreciation d, the model exhibits conventional dynamics of 
capital accumulation where human capital per effective worker (he=H/AL) and physical capital 
per effective worker (ke=K/AL) evolve the following way: 
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where sh and sk denote the shares of human and of physical capital investment in aggregate 
income. Human capital is assumed to depreciate at the same rate (d) as physical capital. The 
steady-state physical and human capital stock levels are 
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The transitory dynamics of income per effective worker near the steady state are approximated 
by 
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Now, the transitory dynamics of output per effective worker near the steady state need to be 
made suitable for empirical analysis. For a more detailed exposition of the model please see 
Dunne et al. (2004) and (2005). The equation for income per actual worker is now 
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where z≡(α-1)(n+g+d) and θ is the elasticity of steady-state income with respect to the long-run 
military expenditure share. While there is a distinction between models of the level of output and 
the growth rate, the distinction is less important in practice as shown in Dunne et al. (2005). It is 
common in the empirical analysis of economic growth to treat s and n as variant across countries 
and time, while g and d as uniform time-invariant constants and A0 as country-specific and time-
invariant (see Knight et al. (1993), Islam (1995), and Dunne et al. (2004)). While s and n are 
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often assumed to be constant in cross-sectional long-run growth regressions, it is much easier to 
justify this assumption when working with panel data. Using five-year averages instead of annual 
values can diminish the effect of business cycles and serial autocorrelation in the empirical 
analysis.  
The conceptual equation shown above can be adapted for empirical analysis using the 
dynamic panel model specification of the following form: 
itititititititit mmhdgnsyy εβββββββ +++++++++=Δ −− 165432110 lnlnln)ln(lnlnln .   (7) 
This equation will serve as the basis for the forthcoming empirical analysis of economic growth 
in the Solow-style regressions. Recalling the earlier discussion of possible linkages between 
development (technology) and arms exports, the relationship between growth and arms exports 
(ax) or imports (am) can be specified in a manner similar to that of military spending. As with 
military spending, arms exports may have a permanent level effect on per-capita income as well 
as on transitory growth rates along the steady-state growth path that can be specified for 
empirical estimation in the following way: 
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ititititit
axaxmm
hdgnsyy
εββββ
βββββ
+++++
++++++=Δ
−−
−
187165
432110
lnlnlnln
ln)ln(lnlnln
.           (8)  
This dynamic panel model specification, but with net arms exports, will serve as the basis for the 
forthcoming empirical analysis of military spending and arms trade effects on growth in the 
Solow framework. As with many empirical models, the above specification is not without its 
problems. Dunne et al. (2005) and Lee et al. (1997) point out that military expenditure and the 
error term in this specification influence output in an ad hoc way, which makes it harder to 
believe that the share of military expenditure could change technology. The same criticism that 
applies to modeling military spending would apply to modeling the effect of arms trade on 
economic growth. Whatever the assumed specification of arms trade and military spending might 
be, if there exists a significant and robust relationship between growth, military spending, and 
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arms trade, a thorough empirical analysis may pick it up regardless of the chosen specification. 
Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) test some recent growth models and fail to reject any of them. 
However, they also find that an encompassing (combined) model provides a significant 
improvement over any of the candidate models they tested. Similarly, I attempt to combine the 
specifications of military spending in Aizenman and Glick (2003), Dunne et al. (2004), and 
Mylonidis (2006), hoping to find a robust relationship between economic growth, military 
spending, and arms trade, regardless of the chosen specification. 
 
3.4 The Barro Growth Model 
In their review of theoretical models on military expenditure and growth, Dunne et al. (2005) 
conclude that the mainstream models of economic growth like the augmented Solow and the 
endogenous Barro growth models should be more suitable for analyzing the defense-growth 
nexus than the Feder-Ram model. The Barro (1990) growth model explicitly allows for different 
forms of tax financed government expenditures to influence output through the production 
function. This model also features the representative agent with explicit utility function that the 
government maximizes. Barro’s (1990) model postulates that the government expenditure has a 
non-linear effect on growth produced by the interaction between the productivity enhancing and 
tax distorting effects of government spending. The theoretical equation describing the 
relationship between economic growth and its determinants turns out rather too complex to be 
estimated explicitly. This problem is often circumvented in the so-called Barro-style regressions, 
in which the theory suggests what variables should enter the unrestricted and ad hoc growth 
regression. The same approach is taken by Aizenman and Glick (2003) and Mylonidis (2006), 
from whom I borrow my Barro-style specified equation to examine the joint effect of arms trade 
and military spending on growth. The Barro-style regression could take on the following form: 
ititititititit meducpopgsygrowth εββββββ ++++++= − 5432110 ,           (9) 
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where traditional variables like the log of initial per capita GDP, share of investment in GDP, 
population growth, and the log of average years of schooling (human capital) are included in the 
regression addition to the share of military spending in GDP. Other control variables could 
include institutional, demographic, and geographic characteristics or an interaction term between 
military spending and threats or corruption as in Aizenman and Glick (2003). In their paper, 
Aizenman and Glick (2003) attempt to clarify a common finding that military spending has an 
insignificant or negative impact on economic growth. They conjecture that this finding arises 
from non-linear interactions between military expenditure, external threats, and corruption. 
Aizenman and Glick (2003) explain the presence of these non-linear interactions in an extended 
version of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) by allowing growth to depend on the severity of 
external threats and the size of military expenditure associated with these threats. In this novel 
specification, national output is influenced by security or military expenditure relative to the 
threat. This might be a more plausible specification of the defense-growth nexus for many 
countries than the specification in which defense spending influences output through technology. 
Aizenman and Glick (2003) hypothesize that military expenditure induced by external threats 
should increase output by increasing security, while military expenditure induced by rent seeking 
and corruption should reduce growth by displacing productive activities. They suggest a basic 
growth equation specification of the following form: 
εβ ++++= Xthrbthrmilamilagy 121 ))(( ,            (10) 
where gy is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, mil is the share of military spending in 
output, thr is the level of military threat faced by a country, and X is a set of control variables. In 
this specification, the direct effects of military spending and external threats on growth are 
assumed negative, while the interactive effect of military spending and threat is positive. 
Aizenman and Glick’s (2003) cross-country estimates over the period 1989-98 indicate that 
when the threat is low, military expenditure reduces output, especially in countries with a lot of 
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corruption. However, when the threat is high, military expenditure increases output. Among the 
avenues for further empirical research, Aizenman and Glick (2003) suggest investigating the 
relationship between arms trade and corruption as pertaining to growth. 
I follow Aizenman and Glick (2003) and analyze the effect of military spending and arms 
trade on growth in the Barro-style regression using an interaction term, but with military 
spending and net arms exports forming the interaction term instead of military spending and 
threats. I also use the same interaction term in the Solow-style regressions.  
 
3.5 Data Description 
The two Solow-style and Barro-style regressions used in this paper are based on the same 
balanced panel dataset and are very similar in terms of the independent variables included, but 
they differ slightly in the specification and format of military spending and some control 
variables. Specifically, the Solow-style regression includes lagged net arms exports and natural 
log of lagged military spending, whereas the Barro-style regression does not. The other control 
variables like investment and population growth enter the Solow-style regression in the natural 
log form unlike in the Barro-style regression.  
In the Solow-style regression, the dependent variable (growth) is the annual growth rate 
of real per capita GDP averaged over five-year intervals. The set of explanatory variables 
includes some typical control variables used in the empirical growth literature such as initial real 
per capita GDP (yit-1), the average number of years of schooling attained by both sexes 25 years 
old and over at all levels of education (hit) taken from the Barro-Lee data set1, annual population 
growth rate10 (nit+g+δ) averaged over five-year intervals, and real investment as a share of GDP 
                                                 
1 Education data is taken from Barro and Lee (1994) dataset, which can be found at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
10 Given the difficulty of obtaining panel data on working age population, I resort to the common alternative of using 
population growth rates instead. Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), I assume g+δ=0.05 to be the same for all 
countries and years and add this value to population growth. 
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(sit) averaged over five-year intervals. Military expenditure (mit) is measured as a share of GDP 
averaged over five-year intervals. A lagged value of military expenditure (mit-1) preceding a five-
year average is also included in the Solow-style regressions. Net arms exports (naxit) are 
measured as (arms exports – arms imports)/(arms exports + arms imports), averaged over five-
year intervals (all in current dollars). The interaction term (naxit)(lnmit) is the product of net arms 
exports and the natural log of military spending. Alternatively, the interaction term is also split 
into two different variables that are similar to Aizenman and Glick’s (2003), who create two 
interaction terms corresponding to the low and high levels of military threat multiplied by 
military spending. In this paper, I split net arms exports into two variables that feature either net 
arms exports or net arms imports (or negative net arms exports in absolute value) and zeroes 
otherwise. Then, the two new interaction terms are the product of military spending and net arms 
exports (naxposit)(lnmit) and the product of military spending and net arms imports 
(namposit)(lnmit). The two interaction terms enter the regression together with net arms exports 
and net arms imports.  
In the Barro-style regressions, the dependent variable (growth) and the explanatory 
variables like the initial real per capita GDP, the average number of years of schooling, military 
expenditure, and net arms exports are measured the same way, except that they may enter the 
Barro-style regression without logs (except for schooling and initial real per capita GDP), 
following Mylonidis (2006) and Aizenman and Glick (2003). Investment share, military 
expenditure share, and population growth enter Barro-style regressions without logarithms. The 
interaction terms in the Barro-style regressions are constructed in the same way as those in the 
Solow-style regressions.  
Data on GDP, population, and investment are obtained from the Penn World Tables, 
version 6.1.  Education data for the human capital proxy are taken from the Barro-Lee (1994) 
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dataset. Data on military spending11 come from various SIPRI Yearbooks (Stockholm 
International Peach Research Institute), while data on arms exports and imports are taken from 
various editions of WMEAT (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers), published by 
the U.S. Department of State after integration with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. Please refer to the appendix for more variable descriptions and data sources. The value 
of each explanatory variable either represents the calculated average over the seven five-year 
periods of the dependent variable (1966 – 1970, 1971 – 1975, 1976 – 1980, 1981 – 1985, 1986 – 
1990, 1991 – 1995 and 1996 – 2000) or the lagged value that correspond exactly to the base 
years 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 (like yit-1, mit-1, and naxit-1). Data reflecting 
the seven five-year periods are analyzed for a sample of 28 countries (Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela). The total number of 
observations in this cross-sectional time-series data set is 196 (7 five-year periods for each of the 
28 countries). 
 
3.6 Empirical Analysis and Results 
The approach taken in this section consists of estimating and comparing the effects of military 
spending and arms trade on economic growth in the Solow and Barro style regressions. The 
effects of military spending and arms trade on growth will be analyzed separately and together 
(via interaction terms) using different estimation techniques for the robustness of results.  
While growth models have been most successful in cross-sectional empirical studies, 
panel data estimation can provide a number of significant advantages over cross-sectional 
                                                 
11 Military spending and some GDP data missing from the PWT was kindly provided by Dunne, Smith, and 
Willenbockel (2004). 
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analysis. Given the availability of cross-country time-series data, the fixed effects estimator or 
the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model seems like the appropriate choice. When the 
unobserved effects are correlated with the observed covariates, the standard estimator used to 
eliminate the potential bias caused by omitted heterogeneity is the fixed effects (within) 
estimator. The fixed effects estimator is popular because it is simple, easily understood, and 
makes robust standard errors readily available, writes Wooldridge (2001). When analyzing the 
fixed effects estimator, the standard assumptions are that the time-varying errors have zero 
means, constant variances and zero correlations. In the presence of omitted variable bias and 
unobserved country and time effects that often appear in country level panel data, the fixed 
effects estimator is preferred over the pooled or random effects estimators. Islam (1995) explores 
the suitability of LSDV fixed effects estimator for growth estimation with panel data. He argues 
that fixed effects estimator is a very suitable technique because of the individual country effects 
being correlated with the exogenous variables in the model. After conducting a Monte-Carlo 
study, Islam (1995) finds that the LSDV estimator, although being consistent in the direction of 
T only, performs very well.  
However, there are a number of problems that plague panel data models in general and 
the LSDV models in particular. Too many dummy variables, for example, may significantly 
deplete the degrees of freedom, while country-specific (groupwise) heteroskedasticity or 
autocorrelation over time would violate the normality and homogeneity of errors assumption. 
Outliers can bias regression slopes, and heteroskedasticity problems from groupwise differences 
can bias standard errors. Panel data may exhibit panel specific or general autocorrelation, 
requiring dynamic panel analysis. The fixed effects OLS estimator would suit fine for panel 
estimation as long as there are no heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. However, 
these conditions are so rare that it is often unrealistic to expect that OLS will suffice for such 
models, notes Yaffee (2003). Under these conditions, the more suitable and commonly used 
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estimator, according to Yaffee (2003), is the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). Greene 
(2002) and Wooldridge (2002) also recommend using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent 
covariance estimator with OLS estimation in fixed effects models for it can produce standard 
errors robust to unequal variance along the predicted line.  
For robust estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and outliers 
Yaffee (2003) recommends using a generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation with 
robust (White, Newey-West) panel standard errors. Wooldridge (2001) notes that some of the 
most interesting recent GMM applications are to panel data. According to Wooldridge (2001), if 
either heteroskedasticity or serial correlation is present, a GMM procedure can be more efficient 
than the fixed effects estimator, but the potential gains over standard applications are largely 
unknown. Generalized method of moments is applied more often to unobserved effects models 
when the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous even after controlling for an 
unobserved effect. Thus, GMM appears indispensable for more sophisticated applications such 
as dynamic unobserved effects panel data models, concludes Wooldridge (2001). Although 
GMM estimators can be asymptotically normal, they may not always be the most efficient ones, 
argues Yaffee (2003). Another concern associated with using a dynamic GMM estimator is a 
loss of valuable observations (information to infer from) in small samples.  
Concerned with the typical issues plaguing panel data estimation, I perform the Breusch-
Pagan heteroskedasticity and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests, which confirm the suspected 
heteroskedastic and AR (1) error structure. In light of this evidence, it is clear that the FGLS and 
Arellano-Bond GMM, with the correctly specified error structure, should be my preferred 
estimators. Considering the growing popularity of the fixed effects estimator and the preceding 
discussion of recommended panel estimators, I propose using the two-way fixed effects FGLS 
estimator with standard errors robust to groupwise heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as a 
benchmark with which the GLS random effects and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators are to be 
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compared. The estimates from two-way fixed effects FGLS, or analogously FGLS-DV (FGLS 
with dummy variables), can be compared to the random effects estimates using the Hausman 
specification test. The random effects model is very different from the fixed effects model and 
requires that the cross-sectional error must be uncorrelated with explanatory variables. One way 
to handle the error term is to assume that the intercept is a random effect (outcome) variable in 
the time-series cross-sectional regression model. The Hausman specification test is the 
commonly used method of deciding which model, fixed or random effects, is more appropriate 
for the chosen empirical analysis. The dynamic panel data estimation method, known as the 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, can be very useful in addressing the endogeneity of explanatory 
variables in growth regressions, as noted by Dreher (2005) in his application of Arellano-Bond 
estimator in globalization and growth study. The GMM estimator is convenient for estimating 
interesting extensions of the basic unobserved effects model when unobserved heterogeneity 
interacts with observed covariates, according to Wooldridge (2001). The one and two step 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator can be robust to violations of heteroskedasticity, normality, and 
autocorrelation in errors. As suggested by Yaffee (2003), the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator 
with instrumental and first-differenced lagged variables may circumvent problems with 
correlations of errors and help obtain additional efficiency gains over other panel data estimators.  
Now, I am ready to present and compare the estimates from Solow and Barro style 
regressions. The basic Solow-style fixed effects regression equation can be specified as follows: 
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where mit and naxit are the military spending and net arms exports variables and (naxit)(mit) is 
their interaction term. The interaction term in this Solow-specified model is an ad hoc empirical 
extension done for the purpose of comparing the Solow-style regression results with the Barro-
style regression results. Note that military spending enters regressions in the log form, while the 
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net arms exports variable does not, due to its taking on negative values in some observations. 
The basic Barro-style fixed effects regression equation is specified as follows: 
ititititit
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where military spending, net arms exports, and the interaction term are defined as before.  
Beginning with the basic Solow-style regression results reported in Column 1 of Table 
A.14, current military spending appears to be negatively and significantly (at 1%) related to 
economic growth in the two-way fixed effects FGLS regression with groupwise heteroskedastic 
and panel-specific AR (1) adjusted standard errors. Using the same dataset, Dunne et al. (2004) 
also find the same negative and significant relationship between current military spending and 
economic growth using fixed effects and random coefficient estimators. Lagged military 
spending is not statistically significant in this FGLS regression. Traditional growth regressors 
such as the lagged per capita GDP, investment share, population growth, and human capital 
(schooling) all have the expected signs and appear statistically significant (except for human 
capital). Adding net arms exports to a regression does not change the negative sign or 
significance level of current military spending, but it makes lagged military spending statistically 
significant and positively related to growth. The current and lagged net arms exports are 
negatively related to growth, but they are not statistically significant and nor is human capital 
(Column 2, Table A.14). The human capital variable in this regression has a wrong sign: it is 
negatively related to growth. This anomalous result regarding the role of human capital in 
growth regressions is not new, according to Islam (1995). He attributes this illogical finding to 
the discrepancy between the theoretical variable H used in the model and the actual variable used 
in regressions. Moreover, the true levels of human capital in some countries have not increased 
by much. Statistically, this leads to a negative temporal relationship between the human capital 
variable used in regressions and economic growth. A richer specification of production function 
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with respect to human capital, writes Islam (1995), would allow the theoretical properties of the 
human capital variable to be better reflected in the regression results.  
The next step is to add an interaction term (military spending times net arms exports) in 
order to test for a significant non-linear relationship between current military spending and 
economic growth that is contingent upon the level of net arms exports. This is the approach used 
by Aizenman and Glick (2003) in their study of the interaction between military spending and 
threats resulting in non-linear relationship between military spending and growth. The regression 
results listed in Column 3 (Table A.14) show a significant positive relationship between the 
interaction term and growth and significant negative relationship between net arms exports and 
growth, while maintaining a significant and negative relationship between current military 
spending and growth. These estimates suggest that while current military spending and net arms 
exports have a negative effect on growth, the effect of military spending on growth becomes 
positive with higher net arms exports. This finding is similar to the non-linear relationship 
between growth and military spending in the presence of military threats found by Aizenman and 
Glick (2003). In this regression, however, population growth and human capital are not 
statistically significant. What is surprising, however, is the negative and significant relationship 
between growth and net arms exports; I had expected to see a positive relationship between the 
two. Perhaps this estimated relationship captures the fact that richer countries tend to be net arms 
exporters and that they tend to grow more slowly than poor countries, as predicted by the Solow 
growth model.  
The next step is to explore the endogenous nature of military spending. As previous 
research has shown, some variables in growth regressions may also exhibit endogeneity 
problems. Fertility, for example, could be influenced by measures of wealth, according to Barro 
and Lee (1994). Similarly, the military spending variable could be subject to the same 
endogeneity problem. Using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, I find that military 
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spending is indeed significantly endogenous.12 One way of addressing this endogeneity problem 
is to use the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. In the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation, 
the right-hand side variables can be instrumented with first-differenced lags, as well as other 
instruments, and the validity of the exogeneity assumption can be tested. The Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimator consists of first-differencing the estimated equation and using lags of the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables as instruments. Due to first-differencing, this 
estimator also removes the individual country effects and first-order autocorrelation that might 
be present in the data.  
Often, good instruments (those correlated with the included explanatory variables and 
uncorrelated with the error term) are hard to find. Goldsmith (2003) finds several significant 
determinants of military spending that could aid in choosing the appropriate instruments. 
Goldsmith (2003) identifies the lagged military spending, economic growth, wealth, and political 
regime type as significant and robust determinants of military spending. Since economic growth 
and lagged wealth (per capita GDP) are already included in the model, I use the natural log of 
political regime type, natural log of total country population, and Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC) as instruments.13 Among these three instruments, the natural log of political 
regime type was found to be negatively and significantly related to military spending in a 
separate 2SLS-IV regression (results not shown to save space). The same regression also picked 
up a significant negative relationship between military spending and net arms exports. The 
Hansen J statistic from the same 2SLS-IV regression showed that the instruments chosen to 
identify current military spending could not be rejected.  
                                                 
12 One interesting result that comes out of the endogeneity testing is that democracy (used as an instrument for 
military spending) appears negative and statistically significant suggesting that the apparent correlation between 
democratic regimes and income per capita could be at least partially attributed to lower military burdens. 
13 Political regime type is constructed according to this commonly used formula (DEMOC-AUTOC+10)/2. The 
democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC) measures come from Polity IV Project. 
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To address the endogeneity of military spending with the available instruments, I use the 
one-step Arellano-Bond GMM estimator with robust standard errors for coefficient inferences. 
However, I use the two-step Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for autocorrelation and validity of 
instruments inferences.14 The results from the one-step Arellano-Bond regression are shown in 
Column 4, Table A.14. Like Dreher (2005), I use the natural logarithm of per capita GDP (five-
year average) as a dependent variable instead of the growth rate because the Arellano-Bond 
estimator is formulated in differences, which means that the regression shows how changes in 
levels are converted into changes in growth. In this specification, the lagged dependent variable 
is no longer capturing growth convergence; instead, it is likely to capture growth momentum. All 
explanatory variables come out of the regression expressed in first-differences or lagged first-
differences. The regression results show that lagged dependent variable, investment share, and 
population growth are statistically significant and have the expected signs. Moreover, the human 
capital variable has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant. The military 
spending variable appears statistically significant and negatively related to growth, while both 
net arms exports and the interaction term are negatively related to growth but not statistically 
significant. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (i.e. validity of instruments) shown in 
Column 4 (Table A.14) implies that the instruments chosen to identify current military spending 
could not be rejected. However, different specifications of Arellano-Bond regression produce 
different signs and significance levels for the net arms exports variable and the interaction term, 
while the estimates for military spending seem robust to different specifications. Only in one 
specification, where military spending is treated as an independent variable rather than an 
endogenous one, does the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator produce a statistically significant 
                                                 
14 Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using the one-step GMM estimator for coefficient inferences because in 
small samples like mine standard errors tend to be under-estimated by the two-step estimator. The two-step 
estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the one-step estimates. The Arellano-Bond 
estimator, however, leads to a loss of observations from 196 to 140 since information from two periods is discarded 
by first-differencing. 
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and negative coefficient for net arms exports. Although the interaction term has the expected 
positive sign in the same specification of the Arellano-Bond regression, it is not statistically 
significant. Although this specification of the Arellano-Bond regression supports the findings 
from the other specifications, its results are not shown here in order not to give the questionable 
exogenous specification of military spending too much credit.  
Now, let’s compare the above Solow-style regressions with the forthcoming Barro-style 
regressions. Table A.15 lists the results for the Barro-style regressions that mimic the Solow-
style regressions in Table A.14. The lagged per capita GDP, investment share, and population 
growth variables (but not human capital) exhibit robust relationship with growth as found in the 
Solow-style regressions. Military spending is statistically significant and negatively related to 
growth, which is a similar to what was found with FGLS by Mylonidis (2006). However, the 
Barro-style regressions do considerably worse than the Solow-style regressions when it comes to 
picking up statistical significance for military spending and net arms exports when the 
interaction term is included. More specifically, military spending is statistically significant and 
negatively related to growth as long as the interaction term does not enter the regression 
(Column 3, Table A.15). Net arms exports and the interaction term are not statistically 
significant at the 5% level, but they have the expected signs. Similar results are observed in the 
Arellano-Bond GMM regression shown in Column 4, Table A.15. Neither military spending nor 
net arms exports, nor the interaction term, are significant in this Arellano-Bond GMM 
regression. The Sargan and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests fail to reject the validity of 
instruments and absence of second-order autocorrelation, respectively. Clearly, the estimates for 
military spending and net arms exports do not appear as robust in the Barro-style regressions as 
the do in the Solow-style regressions.  
The next step is to explore separately the effects of arms exports and imports on growth. 
To do so, I split the net arms exports variable into two variables: net arms exports and net arms 
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imports (in absolute value). If a country is a net arms exporter, then it has zero for the net arms 
imports variable. If a country is a net arms importer, then it has zero for the net arms exports 
variable. Splitting the net arms exports variable into two allows me to create two interaction 
terms through which net arms imports and net arms exports can separately influence growth. As 
before, I begin with the Solow-style regressions listed in Table A.16. In the first such regression 
(Column 5, Table A.16), current military spending is significantly and negatively related to 
growth, while current net arms exports and net arms imports are positively related to growth, but 
only net arms imports are statistically significant. A slightly different story unfolds in the next 
regression (Column 6, Table A.16) when the two interaction terms are included. The major 
difference between the two regressions is that current net arms exports and its interaction with 
military spending appear statistically significant, as shown in Column 6. The net arms exports 
variable is negatively related to growth, and its interaction with the military spending variable is 
positively related to growth.  
The next regression utilizes the GLS random effects estimator with the AR (1) 
disturbance term. This estimator examines the impact of military spending, arms trade and their 
interactions on growth by producing a matrix-weighted average of the between and within 
effects. Surprisingly, the random effects regression performs very well. Variables like per capita 
GDP, investment share, population growth, military spending, and even human capital come out 
statistically significant and have the expected signs (Column 7, Table A.16). However, this 
random effects estimator is rejected by the Hausman specification test in favor of the two-way 
fixed effects FGLS estimator.  
In the new Arellano-Bond GMM regression (Column8, Table A.16), the lagged per 
capita GDP, investment share, population growth, and military spending show significant and 
robust relationship with growth in various specifications of this estimator. The same cannot be 
said about net arms exports, net arms imports, and their interactions terms. None of these 
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variables appear statistically significant at the 5% level in the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM 
estimator (see results in Column 8, Table A.16). The other variables in this regression have the 
expected signs and appear statistically significant (except for human capital). This Arellano-
Bond regression also passes the instrumental variable and second-order autocorrelation tests.  
Let’s repeat and contrast the same regressions in the Barro-style analysis where the net 
arms exports variable is also split up into two. Again, the Barro-style regressions do not produce 
as robust results as the comparable Solow-style regressions do. While, lagged per capita GDP, 
investment share, population growth, military spending, and net arms imports appear significant 
and correctly signed, adding the two interaction terms to this regression eliminates significance 
for the military spending variable and net arms imports. However, the net arms exports 
interaction term is now highly significant and positively signed (see Column 5 and 6, Table 
A.17).   
The GLS random effects estimator does relatively well in terms of producing the 
expected signs and significance for key control variables in this Barro-style regression (Column 
7, Table A.17), but it does worse than the two-way fixed effects FGLS estimator in terms of 
picking up significance for the interaction terms. Moreover, the random effects estimator is 
rejected by the Hausman specification test in favor of the fixed effects estimator. The Arellano-
Bond one-step GMM estimator in the Barro-style specification returns only the lagged per capita 
GDP and investment share variables as statistically significant (Column 8, Table A.17). 
However, this regression passes the instrumental variable and second-order autocorrelation tests.  
Now is a good time to summarize the results from the Solow and Barro-style regressions. 
There are two main conclusions that I can draw from these results. First, although the Solow 
growth model is very tight or restrictive theoretically, its empirical specification adapted from 
Dunne et al. (2004) performs much better empirically, compared to the Barro-style empirical 
specification adapted from Mylonidis (2006) and Aizenman and Glick (2003). In other words, 
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the estimates for military spending are more robust in the Solow-style regressions, compared to 
the Barro-style regressions. Furthermore, I provide the results from the link and omitted variable 
tests for the two models (Table A.18). These tests indicate that the basic OLS estimated Solow 
and Barro style regressions are correctly specified, but the Solow-style regression has more 
explanatory power as evidenced by the R-squared. Thus, I recommend using the augmented 
Solow growth model approach for studying the defense-growth nexus as described in Dunne et 
al. (2004) and Dunne et al. (2005).  
The second important conclusion is that the estimates for military spending are much 
more robust across different estimators than are those for net arms exports (imports) and the 
interaction terms. Since the random effects estimator was rejected in favor of the fixed effects, I 
am left to choose between the fixed effects FGLS and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators. 
According to Wooldridge (2001), generalized method of moments can improve, in large 
samples, over the standard panel data methods like ordinary, two-stage least squares or fixed 
effects when auxiliary assumptions fail. However, Wooldridge (2001) also notes that because 
these standard panel data methods can be used with robust inference techniques allowing for 
heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, the gains to practitioners from using GMM may be small, 
especially in small samples. Considering that the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator reduces my 
sample from 196 to 140 observations, it is a very valid concern. Moreover, the existing 
ambiguity with the correct specification of the endogenous variables and sensitivity of Arellano-
Bond estimates to different specifications complicate the reliability of inference for this 
estimator. Moreover, the fixed effects FGLS takes into account time invariant and individual 
country effects, whereas the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator does not. Thus, I am more inclined 
to infer about the effects of military spending, arms trade, and their interaction terms on growth 
from the two-way fixed effects FGLS or the FGLS-DV estimator. The two-way fixed effects 
FGLS based on the Solow growth model suggests that while higher military spending and net 
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arms exports lead, on their own, to lower economic growth, higher military spending is less 
damaging to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter.  
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
Using fixed effects, random effects, and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators I investigate the effect 
of military spending, arms trade, and their interactions on economic growth in the Solow and 
Barro style regressions. The estimates suggest that the augmented Solow growth model with 
military spending described by Dunne et al. (2005) provides more robust estimates than the 
reformulated Barro model used by Aizenman and Glick (2003). According to the Solow-style 
regression estimates, military spending is negatively related to economic growth. This is a 
finding that is robust to different estimation techniques in the Solow model. However, the 
estimates for net arms exports and interaction terms are not as robust across different estimators. 
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be reached. Higher military spending and net arms exports 
separately lead to lower economic growth, but higher military spending is less damaging to 
growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. In other words, if a country hopes to gain (or 
lose less) in terms of economic growth from additional military spending, it better be a net arms 
exporter. As for a future research avenue, it would be interesting to investigate what determines 
whether a country is a net arms exporter or importer, and whether policy makers can or should 
do anything about it. 
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 Chapter 4 
Ideology, Legislative Shirking, and the Incumbency Advantage: 
Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In a perfectly competitive legislative market voters would deter shirking politicians by voting 
them out of office and reward hard working politicians by reelecting them. In theory, this sorting 
or selection mechanism would lead to reelection of highly qualified incumbents and low 
incumbent turnover rates. Indeed, the turnover rate for incumbents in the U.S. Congress has been 
very low in most years. Apparently, incumbents enjoy a significant advantage over challengers, 
which allows incumbents to win, on average, more than 80% of the time in the U.S. 
Congressional elections. In primaries, incumbents win even more often. While it may seem that 
this evidence supports the outcome expected from a perfectly competitive legislative market, one 
could also argue that the same evidence is consistent with the view that incumbents have 
significant monopoly power in the electoral market giving them significant advantage over 
challengers. This incumbency advantage could stem from gerrymandering, disparities in 
campaign resources, and asymmetric information. If this is true, then the selection process cannot 
effectively deter politicians from shirking or enacting their own ideological preferences while in 
office. 
In this paper, I examine the role of the incumbency advantage in allowing incumbents to 
legislate their own ideological preferences that are different from their constituents. In other 
words, would a rise in the incumbency advantage lead to a rise in legislative shirking? To answer 
this question, I augment the political competition model of Chen and Emerson (2003) by 
showing that incumbents face a tradeoff between vote maximizing and legislating their own 
ideological preferences. In the case of risk-averse voters, the model suggests that incumbents are 
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able to propose a platform farther away from the median voter compared to challengers and still 
get reelected. I proceed to test the model predictions empirically. In their review of the literature 
on voting and legislative shirking, Bender and Lott (1996) acknowledge the lack of empirical 
studies addressing legislative shirking on the aggregate level. I attempt to fill this void by testing 
the predictions of the model using the aggregate statistics for the U.S. House of Representatives. 
I find evidence suggesting that a rise in the incumbency advantage leads to more total legislative 
shirking. In light of these findings, the pattern of declining incumbent turnover in the U.S. 
Congress suggests that the incumbency advantage has risen and so did legislative shirking 
purchased with incumbent vote surplus.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Model 
In a perfectly competitive political environment, one may conclude that an incumbent’s defeat in 
a primary election is nothing but a punishment for legislative shirking or inadequate 
representation of constituents’ interests. The available statistics for the U.S. House and Senate 
elections in the post war period show an increasing likelihood of incumbent reelection. 
Incumbents appear to enjoy a significant advantage over challengers, which allows them to win 
on average 80% of the time in the U.S. Senate, according to Gowrisankaran et al. (2004). The re-
lection rate for incumbents in primary elections is even higher. The idea of efficient market 
sorting of shirking politicians may seem, at first, to agree with this evidence. Gowrisankaran et 
al. (2004) investigate why incumbent senators win so often. They find that the apparent 
incumbency advantage can be explained by selection effects and lower quality of challengers 
running against incumbents relative to higher quality of challengers running for open seats.  
However, a rising likelihood of incumbent reelection may also agree with the well 
documented evidence (Smith, 1999) on decreasing political competition for incumbent seats, 
growing incumbency advantage in campaign resources, and declining importance of party 
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identification. Given this evidence, a persistent increase in the number of reelected incumbents 
may reflect a significant monopolization of the electoral process rather than an efficient sorting 
of shirking incumbents. Asymmetric information, information costs, and ideological bias are 
among the factors that can limit the degree of competitiveness in the legislative process.  
In contrast to the previous research, this paper is less concerned with explaining the 
incumbency advantage and more concerned with its implications for legislative shirking. This 
paper links incumbency advantage with legislative shirking (and ideology) in the context of the 
legislator-voter agency problem. In this paper, I assume that incumbents maximize not only the 
probability of winning an election but also the rents they derive from legislative shirking in the 
broadest sense, regardless of whether it is pursuing their own legislative ideology or collecting 
rents from lobby groups. The idea of incumbents trading some of the incumbency advantage for 
their own preferences is not new. For instance, Sobel (1992) points out that the idea of viewing 
politicians only as the vote maximizing agents is simply naïve. Hence, Sobel (1992) models 
politicians as vote maximizing agents who also pursue their own interests, even sometimes 
rationally getting themselves voted out of office. The obvious conclusion of Sobel’s model is 
that incumbents should be willing to trade some of the extra votes in exchange for pursuing their 
own preferences. This is the same concept that I build on in this paper. I speculate that voter risk 
aversion towards uncertainty may allow an incumbent to get reelected even if that incumbent has 
deviated from the promised platform (i.e. shirked) on which he or she was voted into office.  
In order to build a model of legislative shirking, I borrow the basic model setup from 
Chen and Emerson (2003) who address the issues associated with incumbency and term limits. I 
augment their model to show that an incumbent can shirk and win in an election in the presence 
of risk-averse voters. Like Chen and Emerson (2003), I assume a one-dimensional policy space 
[0, 1]. Furthermore, only two candidates (incumbent and challenger) compete for office in this 
static model. The incumbent’s actual platform that he chooses to implement while in office is 
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denoted by  and the challenger’s proposed platform is denoted by . Let  denote the 
incumbent’s platform that he promised and was elected upon in the previous election. Assume 
that  is given exogenously in the current period.  Similar to Chen and Emerson, I let  to 
be the position (platform) of the challenger as perceived by the voters based on the party’s or 
challenger’s history. In other words,   means that voters do not accept the challenger’s 
platform at the face value. Unlike the challenger, the incumbent runs for reelection on the 
platform  that he chooses to implement while in office. The idea behind this specification is 
that the incumbent may have an incentive or ideological preference for implementing platform 
 that is different from the platform  promised to the voters in the previous election.  
Ix Cx PIx
PIx PCx
PCx
Ix
Ix PIx
Assume that the incumbent is the left-wing candidate and that the challenger is the right-
wing candidate such that 
1
2
10 ≤≤≤≤ PCPI xx . 
Also, assume that voters’ preferences over policies are single-peaked and characterized by the 
following quadratic utility function  
2)()( xyyux −−= , 
where x  is the voter’s most-preferred policy and y  is the actually policy implemented. From 
now on, a voter x is identified by his most preferred policy x  in one-dimensional policy space. I 
assume that x  is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. 
Like Chen and Emerson, I argue that a challenger and an incumbent may differ in their 
ability to propose platforms in an election. Thus, when a challenger proposes some platform , 
the voters form an expectation of that platform due to the uncertainty associated with whether or 
not the promised platform will be implemented. Chen and Emerson allow voters to form an 
Cx
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expectation of the challenger’s platform that is represented by the random variable Cx~  with 
density function )~( Cxg . Then, voter x ’s expected utility associated with platform  becomes Cx
∫ −−−=−−= 1
0
22 ])([)(~)~()~()( xxmxVxdxgxxxu CCCCCCx  
where  is the mean of the random variable )( Cxm Cx~  with variance . Chen and Emerson 
further assume that , which means that the mean of 
)( CxV
CC xxm =)( Cx~  is exactly the proposed 
platform. Then,  is the extent to which the voters perceive the candidate’s real position 
with uncertainty. Hence, the challenger’s utility to voters is a function of uncertainty regarding 
the candidate’s true position ( ) and the distance between the voter’s and the candidate’s 
expected positions
)( CxV
)( CxV
)( xxC − . The voter’s utility for the challenger decreases in both variables. 
Like Chen and Emerson, I further decompose  into , where  is voter 
disutility from intrinsic uncertainty that is associated with the challenger and  is the 
disutility of voters from extrinsic uncertainty caused by the challenger’s strategic positioning. 
Interpret  as the voter’s risk premium for being indifferent between accepting a definite 
position  and accepting a random position 
)( CxV
2)( PCC xxkv −+ v
2)( PCC xxk −
v
Cx Cx~  with the mean value . Meanwhile, 
 could be interpreted as voter’s skepticism towards the platform proposed by the 
challenger. Thus, the more the challenger deviates away from his historical platform or his 
party’s platform the greater is the uncertainty with which he will be perceived by the voters. By 
introducing voter risk aversion towards uncertainty, this framework constrains the challenger’s 
ability to propose any platform by making the voters suspicious (risk averse) about the 
challenger and his platform.  
Cx
2)( PCC xxk −
In contrast to Chen and Emerson, I apply the same variance concept to the incumbent but 
without the intrinsic utility v . This variance, then, represents voter disutility associated with the 
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incumbent choosing platform  that deviates from the promised platform . I interpret the 
departure from the promised platform (
Ix PIx
)( IPI xx − ) as legislative shirking that adversely affects 
voter utility. This legislative shirking specification can include the incumbent’s pursuit of his 
own ideology, rent-seeking, or whatever else the incumbent does that adversely affects voter 
utility. The greater is  the greater is voter disutility from the incumbent’s shirking. I 
assume that incumbent shirks in the direction away from the median voter or  so 
that the incumbent is forced to trade off some of his potential votes for some amount of 
legislative shirking. In other words, the incumbent’s platform  must be always to the left 
of  if he chooses to shirk. If 
2)( PII xxk −
0)( >− IPI xx
Ix
PIx 0)( <− IPI xx  and 2/1<PIx , the problem would be trivial 
because vote and shirking maximizing would become identical and maximizing  would be the 
dominant strategy. This would mean that there is no tradeoff between pursuing legislative 
shirking and maximizing votes. Now, voter 
Ix
x ’s  utility functions associated with each candidate 
can be written as: 
22 )()()( xxxxkvxu CPCCCCx −−−−−=              (1) 
22 )()()( xxxxkxu IIPIIIx −−−−=               (2) 
Define  as the platform chosen by the challenger. Define v  as a fixed level of voter disutility 
from intrinsic uncertainty associated with the challenger and  as the disutility of 
voters from extrinsic uncertainty caused by the challenger’s strategic positioning. Also, define 
 as the incumbent’s strategic platform chosen to be implemented during his term in office and 
 as the platform promised by the incumbent in the previous election. Assume that both  
and  are given exogenously. Now, define 
Cx
2)( PCC xxk −
Ix
PIx PCx
PIx x  such that it is the position of the voter who is 
indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger, which yields the following expression: 
2222 )()()()( xxxxkvxxxxk CPCCCIIPII −−−−−=−−−−            (3) 
 62
 
Solving this expression for x  yields: 
)(2
22 222222
CI
PCCPCCCCCCIIIPIIPIII
xx
xkxxkxkvxxkxxkxkxx −
−+−−−+−+=         (4) 
In accordance with the earlier assumptions, the share of votes obtained by the incumbent is 
determined by this CDF: 
∫ =x xFdxxf
0
)()(                 (5) 
The share of votes obtained by the challenger is then: 
∫ −=1 )(1)(
x
xFdxxf                 (6) 
Now, think of the competition between the incumbent and the challenger as a sequential 
Stackelberg game. The incumbent chooses his platform  first. The challenger observes the 
incumbent’s choice and chooses his platform  based on . The incumbent, in turn, chooses 
the optimal  taking into account the challenger’s response.  
Ix
Cx Ix
Ix
To solve this game, I let the challenger to maximize his vote share )(1 xF− with respect 
to . Solving the first-order condition for  yields the following positive root (the negative 
root is discarded as meaningless). 
Cx Cx
1
))22)(1(( 2222*
+
+−+−−−+−++=
C
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C k
xkxxkxkvxkxkxxkkxkx
x          (7) 
Then, substitute  in (4) to get the vote maximizing objective function for the incumbent. 
Now, let’s specify the objective function for the incumbent in such a way as to give the incentive 
to trade votes in exchange for shirking (or endogenous rents): 
*
Cx
)( IPII xxxU −+=                 (8) 
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The above function says that the incumbent maximizes both ego-rents ( x ) from holding office 
and endogenous rents from legislative shirking ( )( IPI xx − ). The incumbent maximizes x  by 
choosing such a platform ( ) that yieldsIx 2/1>x  or victory in the election. The incumbent also 
maximizes  by choosing such a platform ( ) that increases the rents from shirking 
( ). Thus, the incumbent maximizes  with respect to , and then solves for  in 
order to get the optimal platform that guarantees his reelection. Thus, the optimal platform of the 
incumbent is: 
)( IPI xx − Ix
)( IPI xx − IU Ix Ix
22
2222
*
)2()1(
)())(()()1(()1(
IIICIC
PIIPIPCICPIIPIPCICIIICCPCIC
I kkkkkk
xkxxkkxkvxxkkvkkkkkxkk
x −−−−
−++−−−++−−−=  (9) 
The above expression is the incumbent’s optimal platform  that maximizes votes and 
legislative shirking simultaneously. One can substitute this expression into
*
Ix
x  or equation (4) and 
plug in various parameters to see for which values the incumbent wins the election. The 
incumbent wins the election if 2/1>x . Because the expressions for x  and  are so 
cumbersome and complex, I use numerical simulations to determine what values 
*
Ix
x  and  can 
take on for different parameter values of and v . Using a numerical simulation 
will allow to examine what the model says about the tradeoff between vote maximizing and 
legislative shirking at the optimum. Intuition should help choosing some reasonable parameter 
values. For example, one would expect that  should increase (i.e. shirking would decrease) 
with higher values of  and lower values of , , , and . Let’s see if this intuition is 
supported by numerical simulations.  
*
Ix
,,,, CIPCPI kkxx
*
Ix
Ik v PCx PIx Ck
For sufficiently small values of  and certain values of  and  (for 
example, , =1/3, and =2/3) the simulation results suggest that 
v PCx PIx
1.0≤v PIx PCx 0
*
>
I
I
dk
dx
 and 
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I
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dx
, while x  is within the logical policy range [0, 1]. For lower values of  and higher 
values of  and  (within the assumed restriction placed on  and  previously) these 
relationships also seem to hold. However, these relationships do not hold globally when =  
because the simulation yields no value for and 
v
PCx PIx PCx PIx
Ck Ik
*
Ix x  due to a division by zero. Otherwise, the 
obtained signs make sense. One would expect that as shirking becomes more costly for the 
incumbent (i.e. either  rises or  and v  fall) and causes higher disutility to voters, the 
incumbent will choose such platform  that is closer to  (i.e. that reduces shirking). Thus, 
for certain parameter values, the simulations appear to support the idea that the incumbent with 
some incumbency advantage or political capital (higher  and lower ) can afford to trade 
some of potential votes for legislative shirking as was expected. 
Ik Ck
*
Ix PIx
Ck Ik
For higher values of  and , however,  v PIx
I
I
dk
dx *
 and 
C
I
dk
dx *
 reverse signs. Also, for some 
 and *Ix x  solutions do not exist because of complex numbers in square roots. Higher values of 
 and  often result inv PIx x  exceeding the assumed platform range of [0, 1]. These problems cast 
doubt on the results obtained with higher values of  and , which makes sense because for 
sufficiently high values of v  and  the incumbent is guaranteed a victory regardless of his or 
the challenger’s proposed platforms. In other words, these bizarre results imply that competition 
between the incumbent and the challenger is virtually nonexistent.  
v PIx
PIx
Another interesting simulation result shows that 
C
I
dk
dx *
 is greater than 
I
I
dk
dx *
 in absolute 
value, which implies that the incumbent is likely to shirk more with higher  than with 
comparable values of . If incumbent can influence  and  via campaigning (assuming for a 
Ck
Ik Ck Ik
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moment that  and  are endogenous), than the incumbent would choose negative 
campaigning (i.e. to increase ) as his dominant strategy. With risk-averse voters, this means 
that negative campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning. 
Ck Ik
Ck
Given the assumptions about political competition in this paper, my model shows that for 
certain parameter values the incumbent would find it optimal to trade some of his votes for the 
ability to shirk and would still be able to win the election. One could introduce uncertainty, 
information costs, and make some variables endogenous to enrich the model. For instance, the 
variances associated with the legislators and the information costs could be endogenous in the 
resources that the challenger and the incumbent have and would be willing to use in 
campaigning. The recent presidential campaign inspires to interpret the catchphrases like “flip-
flopper” and “way out of the mainstream” as attempts on the part of the incumbent to increase v  
and  for the challenger.  Ck
The model has some testable predictions. High incumbency reelection rates in themselves 
may not be indicative of shirking, but they may be indicative of the incumbency advantage. The 
incumbency advantage expressed in terms of electoral votes, on the other hand, may be 
indicative of political capital that incumbents can spend to pursue legislative shirking or their 
own ideological preferences. One can think of this incumbency advantage in terms of low  
relative to high  and  in my model. If an incumbent has a high level of incumbency 
advantage, it means that he or she can spend much of it in exchange for shirking, which would 
mean losing some votes as long as he or she can still get 51% of votes. This suggests a possible 
test for legislative shirking by looking at how much victory margins incumbents give up in 
exchange for shirking. 
Ik
Ck v
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4.3 Data Description and Empirical Estimates 
My model predicts that incumbents will spend some of their victory margin or surplus votes in 
exchange their ideological preferences or legislative shirking. If this is so, we should be able to 
observe that an increase in the incumbency advantage does not translate into any significant 
increases in votes for incumbents. Incumbents need to get only 50% plus one of the votes to win 
the election. In the real world, we would have to consider the effect of uncertainty on reelection 
prospects, which suggests a positive risk premium in terms of the extra votes ensuring a shirking 
incumbent against losing the election in the presence of uncertainty. A shirking incumbent, 
therefore, would try to get more than 51% of votes to ensure his victory. After the risk premium, 
the extra votes that an incumbent can get can be spent on shirking. This line of reasoning 
suggests that if there is some shirking optimization going on in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, we should see no significant relationship between incumbency advantage and 
incumbents’ victory margins. In addition, I also test for how changes in the incumbency 
advantage affect the aggregate ideological score for Democrats and Republicans. If the 
ideological score shows a significant deviation away from the median voter in response to a 
larger incumbency advantage, this would suggest that efficient shirking occurs. Hence, I propose 
two different hypotheses to test for the presence of shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives 
at the aggregate level. 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the incumbency advantage should have no significant effect 
on the share of votes incumbents win. 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the incumbency advantage should have a significant effect 
on incumbent’s voting platform in the direction away from the median voter (i.e. in the direction 
of increasing legislative shirking). 
Most of the aggregate data in this study comes from Vital Statistics on Congress by 
Ornstein et al. (2002). The scarcity of some aggregate data for the U.S. House of Representatives 
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puts a serious constraint on the sample size and the choice of applicable estimation techniques. 
The sample used in the first hypothesis testing spans from 1958 to 2000 in two year intervals, 
while the sample used in the second hypothesis testing spans from 1948 to 2000 in two year 
intervals. Since this is time series data it might exhibit some dynamic properties that I need to 
test for in order to choose the appropriate estimators. I also test for endogeneity issues, omitted 
variable bias, and general model specification. Because of the small samples used in this paper, 
the time series tests may not be very reliable. The endogeneity and model specification tests 
could become more useful in this case. The tests suggest using 2SLS-IV besides in addition to 
ARCH and ARIMA. I also use this diverse set of estimation techniques as a robustness check. 
For the first hypothesis testing, I propose this basic OLS regression: 
εββββββ ++++++= swingbillsturnoutredistrictreelectedvotes 543210 .       (10) 
Where votes is the dependent variable measuring the percentage of incumbents in the U.S. house 
of Representatives reelected with at least 60% of the votes, reelected is the incumbent reelection 
rate, redistrict is the dummy variable controlling for redistricting, turnout is the voter turnout 
rate, bills is the average number of introduced bills per Congressman, swing is the percentage of 
seats that changed party. Other control variables such as the unemployment rate and real per 
capita GDP are included in some regressions, but they do not change the main findings. The key 
variable of interest here, however, is reelected. It represents the apparent re-election success of 
incumbents (84% on average during 1948-2000) and a variety of underlying factors contributing 
to it embodied in the so called incumbency advantage. If, for some reason, the incumbency 
advantage rises and leads to higher incumbent re-election rates, then we might expect 
incumbents to win elections with higher victory margins or higher vote shares. If there is no 
statistically significant relationship between these two variables, then my first hypothesis that 
incumbents give up some of their surplus votes in exchange for shirking cannot be rejected. As 
evident in Table A.19, this basic OLS specification passes the link specification and omitted 
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variable tests. However, the reelected variable suspected of being endogenous is likely to be 
exogenous according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (Table A.19) when 
instrumented with the bills and swing variables. 
[Table A.19 about here] 
The next step is to test for possible autocorrelation and unit root presence in the data. As 
Table A.20 shows, the votes variable is trend stationary, serially uncorrelated and exhibits no 
ARCH effects according to the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, Breusch-
Godfrey autocorrelation test, and Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity.15 Moreover, the two series votes and reelected pass the Wald cointegration 
test, Breusch-Pagan independence of residuals test, multivariate Portmanteau (Ljung-Box) white 
noise in residuals test, and Omnibus multivariate normality of residuals test (Table A.20). All of 
the above tests suggest that given the limited number of observations, the suggested OLS model 
should do fine as a benchmark estimator for the proposed hypothesis testing. 
[Table A.20 about here] 
I also fit the model using the ARIMA estimator and the OLS with Newey-West standard 
errors robust to heteroskedastic and AR (1) error structure. The estimates from different 
regressions are presented in Table A.21 and show no significant effect of reelected on votes, 
thereby failing to reject the proposed hypothesis that the higher incumbency advantage provides 
incumbents with freedom to shirk more. The coefficient for reelected is positive but less than 
one, which suggests that even if reelected would appear statistically significant, a rise in the 
incumbency advantage would not translate one-for-one to higher victory margins since some of 
this incumbency advantage would be spent on shirking. The only variable that appears 
                                                 
15 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test using Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) shown in Table A.20 
detects no unit root presence in the first lag, but cannot reject the unit roots in the subsequent lags. The Schwarz 
criterion and Ng-Perron test shown in Table A.20 suggest that the optimal econometric model should have one lag. 
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statistically significant in Table A.21 regressions is real GDP per capita, which is positively 
related to the share of incumbent reelected with at least 60% of the votes. 
[Table A.21 about here] 
For the second hypothesis testing, I propose this basic OLS regression: 
ideology εββββββ ++++++= swingbillsturnoutredistrictreelected 543210 .         (11)  
Where ideology is the combined Democrat and Republican aggregate ideological (D-
NOMINATE) score for the House party coalitions that were developed by Poole and Rosenthal 
(2001) and taken from Vital Statistics on Congress by Ornstein et al. (2002). All other variables 
are the same as before. The ideological scores can range from -0.5 to 0.5. Poole and Rosenthal 
assign the negative range to liberal ideologies and positive range to conservative ideologies. I 
combine the scores for the two party coalitions by taking a simple average of their absolute 
values in order to get a measure of ideological divergence that would be robust to changes in 
median voter preferences. The higher is the average combined ideological score the wider is the 
ideological distance between the two parties. This measure is alternative to subtracting Democrat 
ideology scores (absolute value) from Republican in order to show the degree of ideological 
divergence away from the median voter towards more partisan ideologies on both sides of the 
spectrum. 
To determine the appropriate estimator(s) for testing the second hypothesis I also utilize 
the same specification, endogeneity, and time series tests.16 The evidence presented in Table 
A.19 suggests that the 2SLS-IV estimator is preferred to a single stage OLS estimator in testing 
                                                 
16 The abovementioned OLS model does not pass the link specification and omitted variable tests shown in Table 
A.19. However, the exogeneity of the reelected variable is rejected by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, 
first, at the 10% level of significance and then 5% level of significance when unemployment rate is included as one 
of the regressors. The redistrict and swing instrumental variables appear statistically significant and negatively 
related to the endogenous reelected variable. The two instrumental variables also pass the Sargan over identification 
test as can be seen in Table A.19. 
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the second hypothesis that a rise in the incumbency advantage leads to greater legislative 
shirking reflected in the diverging ideological scores. 
[Table A.19 about here] 
The next step is to examine the time series aspects of this dataset.17 The time series and 
endogeneity tests indicate that the ARCH (1/1) and 2SLS-IV with Newey-West AR (1) and 
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors appear as suitable estimators for testing the second 
hypothesis. 
[Table A.20 about here] 
The estimates used in the second hypothesis testing are shown in Table A.22. All three 
regressions (2SLS, 2SLS with Newey-West errors, and ARCH) in Table A.22 indicate that the 
reelected variable is positively and significantly related to the combined House Democrat and 
Republican ideological score. The highest statistical significance (significant at 1% level) for the 
reelected variable occurs in the ARCH regressions (Column 3, Table A.22). These results appear 
robust to estimation techniques and support the proposed hypothesis that a rise in the 
incumbency advantage leads to more self-interested ideological pursuits by incumbents. 
[Table A.22 about here] 
A number of other interesting inferences can be made from the same three regressions. 
Redistricting can be used by one party against another party as a tool to eliminate the toughest 
competitors—the other party’s incumbents. Reinforcing this intuitive explanation is the negative 
and statistically significant relationship between the redistrict and reelected variables in the 
                                                 
17 The Wald and the likelihood ratio cointegration tests shown in Table A.20 suggest that the two series, ideology 
and reelected, appear to be cointegrated. When the two series are non-stationary, but a linear combination of them is 
stationary, they are said to be cointegrated. In fact, both the ideology series and its residuals do not pass the KPSS 
trend stationary test. However, the ideology series passes the Breusch-Pagan independence of residuals test, 
multivariate Portmanteau (Ljung-Box) white noise in residuals test, and Omnibus test of multivariate normality of 
residuals as shown in Table A.20. However, the DF-GLS test shows unit root presence in the series and the 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity indicates significant ARCH effects 
(Table A.20) suggesting using an ARCH estimator. The Schwarz criterion (7) and modified AIC (1) tests show in 
Table A.20 disagree on the optimal number of lags that should be included in the model. Given the small number of 
observations, I lean towards the smaller lag suggested by AIC. 
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2SLS-IV regressions (Columns 1 and 2, Table A.22). Also, the swing variable is a significant 
instrument for the reelected variable suggesting that structural changes or shifts in the 
ideological preferences of voters have a negative effect on the incumbent reelection rates 
(possibly working through the same redistricting mechanism). Another significant variable that is 
negatively related to the combined average ideology score is voter turnout (Column 2, Table 
A.22). The rational voter model developed by Downs (1957) suggests that if voters observe a 
significant difference between the candidates, they have more incentives to show up to vote in 
that election. Thus, the more dissatisfied the voters are the more likely they are to show up to 
vote, which forces the opposing parties to scale back their ideological departures from the 
median voter. This provides additional support for my argument that the higher the incumbency 
induced ideological divide (legislative shirking) leads to greater voter turnout in subsequent 
elections as statistically significantly observed only in the regressions accounting for 
autoregressive error structure (Columns 2 and 3, Table A.22). Another statistically significant 
variable in all three regressions in Table A.22 that is negatively related to the combined average 
ideology score is the average number of bills introduced per Congressman. This relationship has 
a very intuitive explanation. As the ideological divide between the two House parties grows, it 
becomes harder to strike a consensus and pass the newly introduced bills. This is an example of 
reverse causality issue though. 
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the implications of the incumbency advantage for legislative shirking. The 
model developed in this paper rests on the assumption that incumbents in determining their 
optimal political platform face a tradeoff between maximizing votes and perusing their own 
ideological preferences while in office. As a result, incumbents are willing to sacrifice some 
surplus votes in exchange for engaging in legislative shirking. Numerical simulations show that 
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for some reasonable parameter values an incumbent can trade some surplus votes for being able 
to enact a political platform that is closer to his ideological preferences rather than to his/her 
constituents.  
This empirical analysis of aggregate data for the U.S. House of Representatives supports 
the model’s prediction that incumbents sacrifice some of their surplus votes in exchange for 
shirking or implementing legislation closer to their own ideological preferences. I find evidence 
that a rise in the incumbent reelection rates leads to greater ideological departure from the 
median voter preferences in the U.S. House of Representatives. Overall, the evidence in this 
paper suggests that an increase in the incumbency advantage exacerbates the agency problem 
between legislators and their constituents. In other words, the empirical evidence suggests that 
the electoral market for the U.S. House of Representatives is not very effective in preventing 
incumbents from legislative shirking. 
 
 
 73
 Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusions 
The field of political economy addresses a variety of interesting and relevant issues within the 
nexus between political and economic forces, and the existing research on political regimes and 
their effects on government policy and economic well-being is both vast and impressive. 
Nonetheless, not all of the questions in this field have been completely answered, and not all of 
its puzzles have been resolved. Therefore, any new piece of knowledge that is added to this field 
can help its scholars to uncover the new inner workings of the world and can also provide them 
with new areas for further study. My dissertation is no exception to this rule. This is how the 
progress is made, and the frontier of knowledge is pushed even farther. 
The previous chapters of my dissertation intend to answer the following three general 
questions: (1) Do political and economic freedoms affect the value of life in military conflicts 
through military capital intensity? (2) How do arms trade and military spending affect economic 
growth? (3) Does the incumbency advantage increase the level of legislative shirking in the 
representative democracy? While these may appear as seemingly unrelated issues, they do 
intersect when one thinks about how different political forces come together to influence military 
expenditures, which affect battlefield casualties, economic growth, and general well-being. Some 
creative theoretical modeling and sophisticated econometric techniques are used to answer these 
questions. 
To answer the first question, I develop a theoretical model to analyze if democracies and 
dictatorships, with volunteer or conscription army, value life differently in military conflicts. The 
model allows for formal theoretical insights into how economic and institutional factors may 
affect military capital intensity and subsequent combat casualties. The empirical evidence 
presented in this work supports the model's prediction that more democratic nations with 
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volunteer armies experience lower conflict casualties due to higher military capital intensity. 
Higher reliance on conscription leads to lower military capital intensity, while higher real GDP 
per capita leads to higher military capital intensity. Economic freedom is found to be thirteen 
times more potent than democracy in increasing military capital intensity. One intriguing finding 
is that political and economic freedoms converge in their effects on military capital intensity and 
battlefield deaths in the long-run. 
Following the Dunne et al. (2005) suggestion to study the growth effects of military 
spending in the Solow and Barro growth models, I answer the second question and bring the new 
evidence I discover into the old "butter vs. guns" debate.  I accomplish this by controlling for the 
interaction between arms trade and military spending, and I use sophisticated econometric 
techniques to show how the two variables interact to influencing economic growth. I find that 
higher military spending and net arms exports result in lower economic growth, but higher 
military spending is less detrimental to growth when a country is a large net arms exporter. I also 
find that democratic regimes are inversely related to the size of military spending as a share of 
GDP, which provides some economic explanation for why democracy appears to be correlated 
with per capita income. 
To answer the third question, I develop a theoretical model to analyze the implications of 
incumbency advantage for legislative shirking. The model shows that an incumbent finds it 
optimal to spend some surplus votes on legislative shirking in the presence of risk-averse voters. 
The empirical estimates, based on the aggregate time series data for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, show that a rise in the incumbent reelection rate increases the ideological 
departure of incumbents from the median voter. Additional empirical estimates indicate that a 
change in the incumbency advantage has no significant effect on the share of votes that 
incumbents win. This evidence suggests that the incumbency advantage leads to more legislative 
shirking, as evidenced by the departure from the median voter ideological preference. This 
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evidence suggests that representative democracy can be vulnerable to rent-seeking or 
ideologically driven legislation in the presence of significant incumbency advantage. 
The above chapters provide analyses of several important issues that are typically 
addressed under the realm of political economy. By applying standard economic theory and 
sophisticated econometric techniques, I have secured some interesting findings on the inner 
workings of democracy and its affects on military spending and economic growth. My results 
confirm that political regimes play an important role in government policy formulation and 
economic well-being. However, a democratic regime, with all of its benefits, may not be a good 
substitute for the free market since politicians have strong incentives to pursue their own agendas 
at the expense of public interests. Important knowledge might be gained by analyzing the 
dynamic properties of conflict under different political regimes. An empirical analysis of what 
determines arms exports would also be warranted.  
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Table A.1  
Variable Description and Sources (Pooled Sample) 
Variable Name 
(source) Description 
Mean 
(st. dev.) 
Democracy (1) 
Democracy score consists of the two indexes (DEMOC) and (AUTOC) 
taken from Polity IV database and combined according to the formula 
[(DEMOCi-AUTOCi)+10]/2 that is used extensively in the literature. 
These two 11-point indexes of political regimes are based on formal 
constraints on the executive (AUTOC) and institutional support for 
democracy (DEMOC). 
5.88 
(3.82) 
Conscription (2) 
Index of reliance on military conscription (0-10). A rating of 10 
assigned to countries without military conscription. The index is 
subtracted 10 and multiplying by (-1) for easier interpretation. Since 
conscription is available in 5-year intervals, average values are used 
for those conflicts that fall between the intervals.  
5.41 
(4.52) 
Economic Freedom (2) 
The freedom index identifies seven broad areas of economic freedom. 
It is available in 5-year intervals from 1970 to 1995 for some 123 
countries. Average values are used for those conflicts that fall between 
the intervals. Since conscription is a component of the economic 
freedom index, it is factored out from the index. 
5.56 
(1.25) 
GDP/Capita (3) 
(Residual) 
Real GDP per capita (chained) in the first year of conflict. Residual 
from regressing real GDP/Capita on democracy and economic 
freedom indexes is used in the regressions to avoid biasing the 
estimates. GDP/Capita is used as a proxy for relative capital 
abundance (wealth) in a given country. 
5,834 
(6,487) 
Population (3) 
Country population (in thousands) in the first year of conflict. Since 
countries with larger populations may arguably experience more 
casualties, it is reasonable to normalize conflict deaths by dividing it 
by a country’s population. 
126,010 
(245,149)
ME/Mil. Personnel (4) 
Military expenditures (in constant dollars) divided by military 
personnel, in the first year of conflict. This variable is a proxy for 
capital intensity of military forces given the limitations of military 
data. 
16,535 
(30,481) 
Capability (4) 
Capability variable is the Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC) in the first year of conflict. It is computed as the weighted 
average of a state’s total population, urban population, iron and steel 
production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military 
expenditure during 1816-2001. 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Urban  
Population (4) 
Country’s urban population (in thousands) in the first year of conflict. 
Urban population may proxy for a number of factors like education, 
life expectancy, industrialization, development, and concentrated 
availability of citizens who could be easier mobilized during conflict.  
20,207 
(33,109) 
Duration (5) Conflict duration measured in calendar years from the first year to the last. 
5.50 
(6.71) 
Civil War (5) Dummy variable for civil war. 0.63 (0.48) 
Deaths (5) The best available estimate of the total number of battlefield deaths (both military and civilian) for a given country in a given conflict.  
4,671 
(19,176) 
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Table A.2 
Correlation Matrix (Pooled Sample) 
 Democracy Conscription Freedom GDP/Capita 
Democracy 1.0000    
Conscription -0.2625 1.0000   
Freedom 0.5650 -0.1043 1.0000  
GDP/Capita 0.6272 -0.0294 0.7357 1.0000 
 
 
Table A.3 
Correlation Matrix (Cross-Country Average Sample) 
 Democracy Conscription Freedom GDP/Capita 
Democracy 1.0000    
Conscription -0.0494 1.0000   
Freedom 0.6231 -0.0118 1.0000  
GDP/Capita 0.7384 0.0805 0.7418 1.0000 
 
 
Table A.4 
Single-Stage Robust Regressions (Dep. Var.: Deaths/Conflict Duration) 
 Sample: Pooled Sample: Cross-Country 
Estimator Robust Robust 
Democracy -2.96 (1.99) 
-21.27*** 
(7.99) 
Economic 
Freedom 
-21.89** 
(8.79) 
2.40 
(28.94) 
Conscription 3.32** (1.53) 
-3.81 
(4.26) 
GDP/Capita 
(Residual) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Capability 396** (168) 
4,932*** 
(719) 
Civil War 27.58** (12.94) 
-119** 
(54) 
ME/Mil. Personnel 0.00 (0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant 147*** (40) 
323* 
(163) 
F-statistic 5.14*** 11.07*** 
Observations 169 75 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
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Table A.5 
Single-Stage Regression Specification Tests (After OLS Estimation) 
 Sample: Pooled Sample: Cross-country 
Observations 169 75 
Link test for model specification: 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.15 0.21 
y_hat 0.19 
(0.38) 
0.05 
(0.62) 
y_hatsq 0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0009 
(0.0005) 
Ramsey RESET test--Ho: model has no omitted variables: 
Prob > F 0.01 0.23 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
 
Table A.6 
Testing for Endogeneity of Military Capital Intensity (After 2SLS-IV procedure) 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
Observations: 196 
Sample: Pooled 
Wu-Hausman F test Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq 
test 
P-value1 0.02073 0.01723 
P-value2 0.05566 0.05159 
1Instruments used: democracy.  
2Instruments used: democracy, economic freedom, conscription, GDP/capita (Residual). 
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Table A.7 
Determinants of Battlefield Deaths, Pooled Sample, 1950-2002 
 (1) 
2SLS-IV 
(OLS) 
(2) 
2SLS-IV 
(OLS) 
(3) 
2SLS-IV 
(Robust) 
(4) 
2SLS-IV 
(Median) 
(5) 
2SLS-IV 
(Median) 
1st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable: ME/Mil. Personnel 
Duration -382*** (140) 
-406** 
(201) 
-92 
(70) 
-139 
(134) 
-139 
(134) 
Capability -117,626*** (22,506) 
-187,420***   
(48,341) 
-47,988**  
(16,762) 
-104,638*** 
(25,843) 
-104,638*** 
(25,843) 
Civil War 3,919** (1,952) 
1,639 
(2,941) 
298 
(1,020) 
-339 
(2,042) 
-339 
(2,042) 
Urban 
Population 
0.24*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
Democracy 3,147*** (240) 
-260 
(424) 
508*** 
(147) 
638** 
(292) 
638** 
(292) 
Economic Freedom - 19,940***   (1,254) 
8,328*** 
(435) 
13,999*** 
(860) 
13,999*** 
(860) 
Conscription - -1,804*** (289) 
-434*** 
(100) 
-877*** 
(199) 
-877*** 
(199) 
GDP/Capita 
(Residual) 
4.66*** 
(0.17) 
4.45*** 
(0.29) 
2.06*** 
(0.10) 
3.15*** 
(0.19) 
3.15*** 
(0.19) 
Constant 11,540*** (1,610) 
-97,209*** 
(7,489) 
-34,447***   
(2,600) 
-63,991*** 
(5,134) 
-63,991*** 
(5,134) 
F-statistic 154.77*** 82.28*** 150.82*** - - 
R-squared 0.75 0.81 - 0.47 0.47 
 Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths 
Deaths/ 
Mil. 
Personnel 
2st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable: 
ME/Mil. Personnel -0.09*** (0.03) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.00006*** 
(0.00001) 
Duration 1,093*** (373) 
599*** 
(189) 
-4.51** 
(1.61) 
32.47*** 
(2.87) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Capability 16,863 (16,145) 
51,430 
(48,957) 
1,977*** 
(380) 
1,349** 
(683) 
-7.26 
(11) 
Civil War 485 (1,187) 
980 
(1,079) 
79*** 
(24) 
114** 
(42) 
1.35** 
(0.71) 
Urban 
Population 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0004) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00003*** 
(0.00001) 
Constant 167 (704) 
1,290 
(782) 
94*** 
(24) 
53 
(41) 
3.07*** 
(0.68) 
F-statistic 3.90*** 4.16*** 11.39*** - - 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 - 0.01 0.01 
Observations 311 169 169 169 169 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The OLS regressions use robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroskedasticity. Pseudo R-squared are reported for median regressions. Significance levels: 
*** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) for 
regression (2) has a P-value of 0.42 implying that the instruments cannot be rejected. 
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Table A.8 
Determinants of Battlefield Deaths, Cross-Country Sample, 1950-2002 
 (6) 
2SLS-IV 
(OLS) 
(7) 
2SLS-IV 
(OLS) 
(8) 
2SLS-IV 
(Robust) 
(9) 
2SLS-IV 
(Median) 
(10) 
2SLS-IV 
(Median) 
1st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable: ME/Mil. Personnel 
Duration 64 (186) 
-73.58*** 
(230) 
60 
(116) 
21 
(174) 
21 
(174) 
Capability 10,3170 (66,551) 
68,701 
(68,773) 
255,999 
(168,335) 
194,556*** 
(26,190) 
194,556*** 
(26,190) 
Civil War 6,063** (2,947) 
4,822 
(3,102) 
526 
(1,566) 
818 
(2,296) 
818 
(2,296) 
Urban 
Population 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
Democracy 3,440*** (292) 
2,199*** 
(394) 
1,706*** 
(202) 
2,421*** 
(305) 
2,421*** 
(305) 
Economic Freedom - 8,082*** (1,469) 
4,578*** 
(763) 
4,508*** 
(1,079) 
4,508*** 
(1,079) 
Conscription - -531** (247) 
-277** 
(125) 
-366* 
(198) 
-366* 
(198) 
GDP/Capita 
(Residual) 
2.83*** 
(0.27) 
3.07*** 
(0.32) 
1.82*** 
(0.17) 
2.32*** 
(0.26) 
2.32*** 
(0.26) 
Constant 6,895*** (2,481) 
-40,582*** 
(9,373) 
-18,138*** 
(4,836) 
-17,109** 
(6,959) 
-17,109** 
(6,959) 
F-statistic 54.48*** 40.54*** 54.76*** - - 
R-squared 0.81 0.83 - 0.58 0.58 
2st Stage Estimates. Dependent variable: 
 Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths Deaths/Mil. Personnel 
ME/Mil. Personnel -0.33** (0.16) 
-0.13** 
(0.04) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0001) 
Duration 2,240** (1,060) 
501** 
(200) 
41** 
(17) 
131*** 
(44) 
0.68 
(0.83) 
Capability 135,101** (67,560) 
65,360***   
(18,489) 
36,992***  
(6,259) 
41,544*** 
(8,692) 
294* 
(163) 
Civil War 6,396 (4,071) 
1,977 
(1,396) 
-544** 
(233) 
-324 
(602) 
13 
(11) 
Urban 
Population 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant -6,418 (5,232) 
598 
(1,187) 
820*** 
(215) 
660 
(552) 
8.54 
(9.87) 
F-statistic 1.30 7.09*** 16.13*** - - 
R-squared 0.27 0.19 - 0.07 0.02 
Observations 84 75 75 75 75 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The OLS regressions use robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroskedasticity. Pseudo R-squared are reported for median regressions. Significance levels: 
*** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) for 
regression (7) has a P-value of 0.33 implying that the instruments cannot be rejected. 
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Table A.9 
Featured Conflicts and Their Participants, Pooled Sample 
Conflict Case Freq. 
Perce
nt Conflict Case 
Fre
q. 
Perce
nt 
Algeria (FIS) 1 0.32 Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 2000-1 1 0.32 
Algeria v. Morocco 1963 2 0.64 Iran v. Iraq 1974 1 0.32 
Angola (UNITA) I 2 0.64 Iraq v. Kuwait & Multinational Coalition 22 7.07 
Angolan Independence 1 0.32 Israel v. Egypt 1969-70 2 0.64 
Argentina (ERP, Montoneros) 1 0.32 Israel v. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria 19 4 1.29 
Argentina (Military) 1963 1 0.32 Israel v. Egypt, Syria 1973 5 1.61 
Argentina vs UK 1982 2 0.64 Israel, UK & France v. Egypt 1956 4 1.29 
Azerbaijan (OPON)  1 0.32 Kenya (Military faction) 1982 1 0.32 
Bangaldesh (Chittagong Hill Insurgency) 1 0.32 Korean War 13 4.18 
Bolivia (ELN) 1 0.32 Laos Civil War II 1 0.32 
Brunei rebellion v. UK 1 0.32 Laos v. Thailand 1986-8 1 0.32 
Burkina Faso (Popular Front) 1 0.32 Lebanon (Independent Nasserites) 1 0.32 
Burkina Faso v. Mali 1985 2 0.64 Lebanon Civil War 1975-90 4 1.29 
Burundi Civil War 1990 1 0.32 Madagascar (Monima Nations) 1 0.32 
Cambodian Civil War I 1 0.32 Malaysia (CCO) 1 0.32 
Cameroon (Military Faction) 1 0.32 Malaysia (CPM) 1974-5 1 0.32 
Cameroon Independence 1 0.32 Malaysia (CPM) 1981 1 0.32 
Cameroon v. Nigeria 1996 2 0.64 Mali (Tuareg Insurgency) 1990 1 0.32 
Chad v. Libya 1987 1 0.32 Mali (Tuareg Insurgency) 1994 1 0.32 
Chad v. Nigeria 1983 1 0.32 Mau Mau Rebellion 1 0.32 
Chadian Civil War I 2 0.64 Mexico (Chiapas) 1994 1 0.32 
Chadian Civil War II 1 0.32 Morocco (Military faction) 1971 1 0.32 
Chile (Military Faction) 1 0.32 Mozambique Civil War 1976-92 3 0.96 
China v. Burma 1969 1 0.32 Mozambique Indep. 1 0.32 
China v. India 1962 2 0.64 Namibia Indep. 1 0.32 
China v. Taiwan 1952-5 2 0.64 Nepal (Nepali Congress) 1960-2 1 0.32 
China v. Taiwan 1958 3 0.96 Nepal Civil War 1997-2002 1 0.32 
China v. USSR 1969 1 0.32 Nicaragua (Contras) 1981-9 1 0.32 
China v. Vietnam 1978-9 1 0.32 Nicaragua (FSLN) 1978-9 1 0.32 
China v. Vietnam 1980-1 1 0.32 Niger (Toubou) 1996-7 1 0.32 
China v. Vietnam 1983-4 1 0.32 Niger (Tuareg Insurgency) 1990-2 1 0.32 
China v. Vietnam 1986-8 1 0.32 Niger (Tuareg Insurgency) 1994 1 0.32 
Congo/Zaire (Katanga) 1 0.32 Niger (Tuareg Insurgency) 1997 1 0.32 
Cuba (National Revolutionary Council) 1 0.32 Nigeria (Biafra) 1 0.32 
Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots & Turkey) 1 0.32 Nigeria (Military faction) 1966 1 0.32 
Dominican Republic (Military Faction) 1 0.32 Oman (Dhofar Rebellion) 1 0.32 
Ecuador v. Peru 1995 2 0.64 Oman Civil Strife 1957 1 0.32 
Egypt (Islamists) 1 0.32 Pakistan (Baluchi Insurgency) 1 0.32 
Egypt v. UK 1951-2 2 0.64 Pakistan (East Pakistan) 1 0.32 
El Salvador (Military Faction) 1 0.32 Pakistan (Islamists) 1 0.32 
El Salvador v. Honduras 1969 2 0.64 Panama (Military faction) 1 0.32 
Ethiopia (Eritrea) 1 0.32 Panama v. USA 1989 2 0.64 
Ethiopia (Military Faction) 1 0.32 Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) 1989-90 1 0.32 
Ethiopia (Oromiya) II 1 0.32 Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) 1992-6 1 0.32 
Ethiopia Civil War 1976-91 1 0.32 Paraguay (Military faction) 1954 1 0.32 
Ethiopia v. Somalia 1973 1 0.32 Paraguay (Military faction) 1989 1 0.32 
Ethiopia v. Somalia 1983 1 0.32 Peru (MIR , Tpac Amaru , ELN) 1965-6 1 0.32 
Ethiopia v. Somalia 1987 1 0.32 Peru (Sendero Luminoso) 1 0.32 
Gabon (Military faction) 2 0.64 Philippines (Mindanao) 1970-90 1 0.32 
Ghana (Military Faction) 1983 1 0.32 Philippines (Mindanao) 1993-2002 1 0.32 
Ghana (Military faction) 1966 1 0.32 Philippines (NPA) 1972-95 1 0.32 
Ghana (Military faction) 1981 1 0.32 Philippines (NPA) 1997 1 0.32 
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Table A.9 
 Featured Conflicts and Their Participants (Continued) 
Grenada (US Invasion) 1 0.32 Philippines (NPA) 1999-2002 1 0.32 
Guatemala (Conservative Coup and 
Army) 1 0.32 Russia (Parliamentary forces) 1 0.32 
Guatemalan Civil War (1965-95) 1 0.32 Rwanda Civil War 1990-4 1 0.32 
Guinea (Military Faction) 2000 1 0.32 Rwanda Civil War 1998-2002 1 0.32 
Guinea (Military faction) 1970 1 0.32 Senegal (Casamance) 1990 1 0.32 
Guinea Bissau Independence 1 0.32 Senegal (Casamance) 1992-3 1 0.32 
Haiti 1991 1 0.32 Senegal (Casamance) 1995 1 0.32 
Honduras v. Nicaragua 1957 2 0.64 Senegal (Casamance) 1997-2001 1 0.32 
India (Assam) 1 0.32 Sierra Leone Civil War 1991-2000 2 0.64 
India (Jarkhand) 1993 1 0.32 Somalia Civil War 1981-96 21 6.75 
India (Kashmir) 1 0.32 South Africa Civil War 1991-93 1 0.32 
India (Manipur Insurgency) 1982-9 1 0.32 Spain & France vs. Moroccan insurgency 2 0.64 
India (Manipur Insurgency) 1991-4 1 0.32 Spain (ETA) 1980-1 1 0.32 
India (Manipur Insurgency) 1997-2000 1 0.32 Spain (ETA) 1987 1 0.32 
India (Mizoram) 1966-8 1 0.32 Spain (ETA) 1991-2 1 0.32 
India (NNC, NSCN) 1956-9 1 0.32 Sri Lanka (JVP) 1971 1 0.32 
India (NNC, NSCN) 1961-8 1 0.32 Sri Lanka (JVP) 1989-90 1 0.32 
India (NNC, NSCN) 1989-97 1 0.32 Sri Lanka (Tamil Insurgency) 1983-2001 2 0.64 
India (Naxalites & CPI-M) 1967-72 1 0.32 Syria (Military faction) 1966 1 0.32 
India (Naxalites, PWG, MCC) 1989-94 1 0.32 Syria (Muslim Brotherhood) 1966 1 0.32 
India (Naxalites, PWG, MCC) 1996-2002 1 0.32 Tajikistan (Movement for Peace) 1998 1 0.32 
India (Sikh Insurgency) 1 0.32 Thailand (CPT) 1970-82 1 0.32 
India (Tripura Insurgency) 1978-88 1 0.32 Thailand (Military faction) 1 0.32 
India (Tripura Insurgency) 1993 1 0.32 Togo (MTD) 1986 1 0.32 
India (Tripura Insurgency) 1995-2002 1 0.32 Tunisia (Tunisienne Restance Army) 1 0.32 
India v. Pakistan 1964 1 0.32 Tunisia v. France 1961 2 0.64 
India v. Pakistan 1965 1 0.32 Turkey (Devrimci Sol) 1 0.32 
India v. Pakistan 1984 2 0.64 Turkey (Kurdish Insurgency) 1 0.32 
India v. Pakistan 1987 2 0.64 UK v. Cypriot Insurgents 1 0.32 
India v. Pakistan 1989-90 2 0.64 UK v. S Yemen Insurgency 1 0.32 
India v. Pakistan 1992 2 0.64 US v. Puerto Rican Nationalists 1 0.32 
India v. Pakistan 1996-2002 2 0.64 Uganda (Military faction) 1971 1 0.32 
Indonesia (Aceh) 1989-91 1 0.32 Uganda (Military faction) 1977 1 0.32 
Indonesia (Aceh) 1999-2002 1 0.32 Uganda (UPA) 1972 1 0.32 
Indonesia (East Timor) 1975-89 1 0.32 Uganda Civil War 1978-9 2 0.64 
Indonesia (East Timor) 1992 1 0.32 Uganda Civil War 1981-91 1 0.32 
Indonesia (East Timor) 1997-8 1 0.32 Uganda Civil War 1994-2002 1 0.32 
Indonesia (West Papua) 1965 1 0.32 United Kingdom (N. Ireland) 1971-93 1 0.32 
Indonesia (West Papua) 1976-8 1 0.32 United Kingdom (N. Ireland) 1998 1 0.32 
Iran (Kurdish Insurgency) 1966-8 1 0.32 Venezuela (Military faction) 1962 2 0.64 
Iran (Kurdish Insurgency) 1990 1 0.32 Vietnam War 6 1.93 
Iran (Kurdish Insurgency) 1993 1 0.32 Western Sahara Insurgency 2 0.64 
Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 1986-8 1 0.32 Yemen (Royalists) 1962-70 1 0.32 
Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 1991-3 1 0.32 Yemen Civil War 1994 1 0.32 
Iran (Mujahideen e Khalq) 1991-3 1 0.31 Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 17 5.47 
   Total 311 100.00 
Notes: “Best” estimates of total battlefield deaths for a country or country’s military in the above conflicts are 
used in both samples in this paper. The cross-country sample uses country averages of these battle deaths. Data 
source: Polity IV Project. 
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Table A.10 
Countries Featured in the Average Cross-Country Sample 
Algeria Guinea Peru 
Angola Haiti Philippines 
Argentina Honduras Poland 
Australia Hungary Portugal 
Azerbaijan India Russia 
Bangladesh Indonesia Rwanda 
Belgium Iran Senegal 
Bolivia Israel Sierra Leone 
Botswana Italy South Africa 
Burkina Faso Jordan Spain 
Burundi Kenya Sri Lanka 
Cameroon Madagascar Sweden 
Canada Malaysia Syria 
Chad Mali Taiwan 
Chile Mauritania Tajikistan 
China Mexico Tanzania 
Colombia Morocco Thailand 
Czech Republic Mozambique Togo 
Denmark Nepal Tunisia 
Ecuador Netherlands Turkey 
Egypt New Zealand Uganda 
El Salvador Nicaragua United Kingdom 
Ethiopia Niger United States 
France Nigeria Venezuela 
Gabon Norway Yemen 
Germany Pakistan Zimbabwe 
Ghana Panama Total number of countries: 84* 
Greece Papua New Guinea  
Guatemala Paraguay  
* When dropped, missing values for the economic freedom index and conscription index reduce this 
sample to 75 countries. 
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Table A.11 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
growthit (2)
Non-overlapping five-year average growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(Laspeyres). 
2.46 
(2.17) 
yit-1 (2) Real GDP per capita in the year preceding the five-year average period. 
9.09 
(0.80) 
sit (2) Five-year average investment as a share of GDP (Laspeyres). 
21.42 
(6.36) 
nit+g+δ (2)
Five-year average population growth rate n + 0.05 (the assumed value for 
g+δ). 
1.83 
(0.15) 
popgit (2) Five-year average population growth rate. 
1.27 
(0.94) 
hit (6)
Average number of years of schooling for both sexes 25 years of age or 
older. 
6.59 
(2.63) 
mit (5) Five-year average military expenditure as a share of GDP. 
3.69 
(3.13) 
naxit (4)
Five-year average of net arms exports computed as (arms exports - arms 
imports)/ (arms exports + arms imports), all in current values. 
-0.39 
(0.63) 
naxposit
Five-year average of net arms exports computed as (arms exports - arms 
imports)/ (arms exports + arms imports). Set equal to zero when the value is 
negative. 
0.14 
(0.28) 
namposit
Five-year average of net arms imports computed as (arms imports - arms 
exports)/ (arms exports + arms imports). Set equal to zero when the value is 
negative. 
0.53 
(0.41) 
demit (1)
Democracy score. Consists of the two indexes (DEMOC) and (AUTOC) 
taken from Polity IV database and combined according to the commonly 
used formula [(DEMOCi-AUTOCi)+10]/2. 
2.01 
(0.63) 
popit (2) Natural log of total country population. 
17.19 
(1.23) 
cincit (3)
Natural log of the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). It is 
computed as the weighted average of a state’s total population, urban 
population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military 
personnel, and military 
Expenditure. 
-4.74 
(1.14) 
1. Polity IV Project. 2000. Political Regime Characteristics and Transition, 1800–2000. Electronic data. 
(version p4v2000). College Park, Md.: CIDCM, University of Maryland. 
2. Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
3. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and 
Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-8. 
4. Compiled from various issues of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) by the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
5. Compiled by Dunne et al. (2004) from Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks. 
6. Barro and Lee (1994) data can be found at: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
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Figure A.1 
Arms Trade in Developed Countries: 1989-1999 
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Table A.12 
Countries Featured in the Sample 
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Argentina 7 3.57 3.57 
Australia 7 3.57 7.14 
Belgium 7 3.57 10.71 
Brazil 7 3.57 14.29 
Canada 7 3.57 17.86 
Chile 7 3.57 21.43 
Denmark 7 3.57 25.00 
France 7 3.57 28.57 
Germany 7 3.57 32.14 
Greece 7 3.57 35.71 
India 7 3.57 39.29 
Israel 7 3.57 42.86 
Italy 7 3.57 46.43 
Japan 7 3.57 50.00 
Korea, Republic of 7 3.57 53.57 
Malaysia 7 3.57 57.14 
Netherlands 7 3.57 60.71 
Norway 7 3.57 64.29 
Pakistan 7 3.57 67.86 
Philippines 7 3.57 71.43 
Portugal 7 3.57 75.00 
South Africa 7 3.57 78.57 
Spain 7 3.57 82.14 
Sweden 7 3.57 85.71 
Turkey 7 3.57 89.29 
United Kingdom 7 3.57 92.86 
United States 7 3.57 96.43 
Venezuela 7 3.57 100.00 
Total 196 100.00  
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Table A.13 
Pair-wise Correlations of Variables 
 growth lnyit-1 lnsit ln(nit+g+δ) lnhit lnmit naxit
growthit 1.0000       
lnyit-1 -0.2037* 1.0000      
lnsit 0.3323* 0.5713* 1.0000     
ln(nit+g+δ) -0.0496 -0.6735* -0.4499* 1.0000    
lnhit -0.0940 0.8257* 0.4900* -0.5208* 1.0000   
lnmit -0.0074 -0.0006 0.0289 0.0969 0.1200 1.0000  
naxit -0.0830 0.4461* 0.1480* -0.3872* 0.3651* 0.0574 1.0000 
demit -0.0972 0.3464* 0.1495* -0.2760* 0.3489* -0.0966 0.2704* 
popit 0.0238 -0.3552* -0.3356* 0.1499* 
-
0.2815*
-
0.3010* 0.1878* 
cincit -0.0298 0.1168 -0.0578 -0.1424* 0.0079 -0.1184 0.4132* 
* Significant at 5%. 
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Table A.14 
The Growth Effects of Military Spending and Net Arms Exports in the Augmented Solow 
Growth Model 
 1 2 3 4 
lnyit-1 -5.28*** 
(0.54) 
-5.32*** 
(0.56) 
-5.51*** 
(0.56) 
0.72*** 
(0.06) 
lnsit 4.51*** 
(0.31) 
4.59*** 
(0.37) 
4.78*** 
(0.37) 
0.30*** 
(0.03) 
ln(nit + g + δ) -4.28*** 
(1.28) 
-2.96** 
(1.39) 
-2.17 
(1.40) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
lnhit 0.23 
(0.57) 
-0.12 
(0.63) 
-0.17 
(0.62) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
lnmit -1.53*** 
(0.48) 
-2.16*** 
(0.51) 
-1.71*** 
(0.54) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
lnmit-1 0.49 
(0.44) 
1.17*** 
(0.43) 
0.80* 
(0.45) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
naxit - -0.32 (0.24) 
-1.03*** 
(0.38) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
naxit-1 - -0.33 (0.22) 
-0.28 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
(naxit)( lnmit) - - 
0.63** 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Constant 35.54*** (7.78) 
36.55*** 
(10.39) 
35.80*** 
(11.19) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Estimator FGLS FGLS FGLS GMM 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan test (p-level) - - - 0.74 
Arellano-Bond (p-level) - - - 0.84 
Observations 196 196 196 140 
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000. 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses 
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted Durbin-
Watson computation. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no second-order autocorrelation in 
the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with Huber-White sandwich. Instruments 
include: dem, pop, cinc. 
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Table A.15 
The Growth Effects of Military Spending and Net Arms Exports in the Reformulated 
Barro Growth Model 
 1 2 3 4 
lnyit-1 -5.18*** 
(0.55) 
-5.26*** 
(0.55) 
-5.41*** 
(0.57) 
0.67*** 
(0.09) 
sit 0.25*** 
(0.02) 
0.25*** 
(0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
popgit -0.85*** 
(0.22) 
-0.83*** 
(0.21) 
-0.78*** 
(0.23) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
lnhit -1.01 
(0.62) 
-0.76 
(0.64) 
-0.82 
(0.64) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
mit -0.08** 
(0.04) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
naxit - -0.36 (0.24) 
-0.51* 
(0.30) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
(naxit)(mit) - - 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant 37.61*** (7.95) 
38.47*** 
(7.95) 
38.82*** 
(8.34) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Estimator FGLS FGLS FGLS GMM 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan test (p-level) - - - 0.89 
Arellano-Bond (p-level) - - - 0.33 
Observations 196 196 196 140 
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000. 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses 
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted Durbin-
Watson computation. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no second-order autocorrelation in 
the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with Huber-White sandwich. Instruments 
include: dem, pop, cinc. 
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Table A.16 
The Effects of Military Spending, Net Arms Exports and Imports on Growth in the 
Augmented Solow Growth Model 
 5 6 7 8 
lnyit-1 -4.83*** 
(0.55) 
-5.18*** 
(0.53) 
-2.94*** 
(0.40) 
0.69*** 
(0.07) 
lnsit 4.34*** 
(0.41) 
4.91*** 
(0.41) 
4.65*** 
(0.56) 
0.29*** 
(0.03) 
ln(nit + g + δ) -2.14 
(1.48) 
-1.59 
(1.37) 
-4.04*** 
(1.38) 
-0.18** 
(0.08) 
lnhit -0.29 
(0.65) 
-0.91 
(0.61) 
1.15** 
(0.55) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
lnmit -2.72*** 
(0.53) 
-3.13*** 
(0.63) 
-2.16** 
(0.87) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
lnmit-1 1.55*** 
(0.43) 
1.34*** 
(0.46) 
0.87 
(0.67) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
naxposit
0.15 
(0.42) 
-2.20*** 
(0.60) 
-2.83 
(1.80) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
naxposit-1
0.29 
(0.36) 
0.29 
(0.30) 
1.03 
(0.72) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
namposit
0.62** 
(0.33) 
0.18 
(0.55) 
-1.34 
(0.96) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
namposit-1
0.98*** 
(0.35) 
0.83*** 
(0.31) 
0.06 
(0.51) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
(naxposit)(lnmit) - 
2.83*** 
(0.50) 
2.54* 
(1.33) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
(namposit)(lnmit) - 
0.26 
(0.39) 
1.44* 
(0.76) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Constant 30.05*** (8.43) 
26.97*** 
(7.78) 
21.57*** 
(4.79) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Estimator FGLS FGLS GLS-RE GMM 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) - - 0.00 - 
Baltagi-Wu LBI 
(Durbin-Watson statistic) - - 
2.32 
(2.06) - 
Sargan test (p-level) - - - 0.99 
Arellano-Bond (p-level) - - - 0.81 
Observations 196 196 196 140 
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000. 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses 
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted Durbin-
Watson computation. Random effects (GLS-RE) regression estimated with GLS and AR (1) error 
structure. The Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic is equivalent to the Durbin-Watson statistic: if it is far below 2.00 
then a correction for serial correlation is necessary. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no 
second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with 
Huber-White sandwich. Instruments include: dem, pop, cinc. 
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Table A.17 
The Growth Effects of Military Spending, Net Arms Exports and Imports in the 
Reformulated Barro Growth Model 
 5 6 7 8 
lnyit-1 -5.02*** 
(0.56) 
-5.29*** 
(0.57) 
-2.61*** 
(0.37) 
0.63*** 
(0.09) 
sit 0.24*** 
(0.02) 
0.27*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
popgit -0.81*** 
(0.22) 
-0.69*** 
(0.23) 
-0.63*** 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
lnhit -0.77 
(0.65) 
-1.09* 
(0.65) 
0.91* 
(0.52) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
mit -0.10** 
(0.04) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
naxposit 0.41 
(.41) 
-0.60 
(0.62) 
-1.59 
(1.41) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
namposit
0.82** 
(0.32) 
0.71 
(0.44) 
-0.82 
(0.68) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
(naxposit)(mit) - 
0.40*** 
(0.15) 
0.55* 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
(namposit)(mit) - 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant 34.08 (8.28) - 
21.22*** 
(2.93) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
Estimator FGLS FGLS GLS-RE GMM 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) - - 0.00 - 
Baltagi-Wu LBI 
(Durbin-Watson statistic) - - 
2.23 
(1.95) - 
Sargan test (p-level) - - - 0.98 
Arellano-Bond (p-level) - - - 0.22 
Observations 196 196 196 140 
Notes: Dependent variable: five-year average growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1965 to 2000. 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. FGLS uses 
errors corrected for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and AR (1) autocorrelation with adjusted Durbin-
Watson computation. Random effects (GLS-RE) regression estimated with GLS and AR (1) error 
structure. The Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic is equivalent to the Durbin-Watson statistic: if it is far below 2.00 
then a correction for serial correlation is necessary. Null hypothesis in two-step Arellano-Bond test: no 
second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. A-B one-step GMM estimator uses robust errors with 
Huber-White sandwich. Instruments include: dem, pop, cinc. 
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Table A.18 
Link and Omitted Variable Tests of the Solow and Barro Style Regressions 
 Solow Barro 
Link test for model specification: 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.68 0.65 
y_hat 0.95*** 
(0.09) 
0.91*** 
(0.10) 
y_hatsq 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Ramsey RESET test--Ho: model has no omitted variables: 
Prob > F 0.13 0.12 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
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Table A.19 
Link Specification, Omitted Variable, and Endogeneity Tests 
 Hypothesis/Model 1 Hypothesis/Model 2 
Link test for model specification (after OLS) 
P-value 0.01 0.00 
R-squared 0.42 0.79 
y_hat -0.71 (6.50) 
-3.47** 
(1.36) 
y_hatsq 1.24 (4.71) 
7.53*** 
(2.28) 
Ramsey RESET test—H0: model has no omitted variables 
P-value 0.75 0.01 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test—H0: reelected variable is exogenous 
P-value 0.68 0.08†
Sargan over-identification test of all instruments 
P-value 0.33 0.86 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
†The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P-value is 0.04 and Sargan test’s P-value is 0.85 when unemployment rate 
is included as a regressor in the 2SLS-IV regression. 
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Table A.20 
Autocorrelation and Unit Root Tests 
 Hypothesis/Model 1 Hypothesis/Model 2 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation—H0: no serial correlation 
P-value 0.23 0.00 
Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation—H0: no serial correlation 
P-value 0.33 0.00 
Lagrange multiplier test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH)  
H0: no ARCH effects 
P-value 0.69 0.02 
Cointegration likelihood ratio test 
P-value 0.143 0.351 
Cointegration Wald test 
P-value 0.022 0.283 
Breusch-Pagan independence of residuals test (optimal lag) 
P-value 0.125 (lag 3) 0.159 (lag 1) 
Multivariate Portmanteau (Ljung-Box) white noise in residuals test (optimal lag) 
P-value 0.177 (lag 3) 0.196 (lag 1) 
Omnibus test of multivariate normality of residuals (optimal lag) 
P-value 0.795 (lag 1) 0.871 (lag 1) 
KPSS test—H0: trend stationary 
KPSS test statistic 0.113 0.275*** 
KPSS test statistic —H0: trend stationary in residuals 
KPSS test statistic 0.116 0.121* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) test—H0: unit root 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 1) -3.567** -0.807 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 2) -1.423 -0.923 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 3) -1.351 -0.884 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 4) -1.102 -0.785 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 5) -1.543 -2.681* 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 6) -0.651 -2.794* 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 7) -0.667 -4.054*** 
DF-GLS tau test statistic (lag 8) -0.472 -3.152** 
Optimal lag length (Ng-Perron seq t) 1 7 
Minimum Schwarz criterion at lag 1 7 
Minimum MAIC at lag 6 1 
Notes: Significance levels at which H0 is rejected: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Dickey–Fuller 
Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) is the Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) approach of unit root 
testing and is preferred by many time series econometricians to the “first–generation” tests like that of 
Dickey and Fuller. The DF-GLS test is similar to the augmented Dickey-Fuller "t" test, but has the best 
overall performance in terms of small-sample size and power. Inferences drawn from the DF–GLS test 
are likely to be more robust than those based on the first–generation tests. Hence, DF–GLS should be 
your unit root test of choice, states Baum (2001). 
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Table A.21 
Determinants of the Share of Incumbents in the House of Representatives Reelected with at 
Least 60% of the Votes, 1958-2000 (Hypothesis 1 Testing) 
 1 2 3 4 
Percent of incumbents 
reelected 
0.26 
(0.56) 
0.61 
(0.59) 
0.61 
(0.54) 
0.13 
(0.42) 
Redistricting dummy 0.02 (0.06) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
Voter turnout -0.33 (0.24) 
-0.11 
(0.26) 
-0.11 
(0.23) 
-0.00 
(0.12) 
Bills per Congressman -0.00 (0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Percent of seats that changed 
party 
-0.43 
(0.62) 
0.08 
(0.66) 
0.08 
(0.63) 
1.06 
(0.48) 
Unemployment rate - 0.02 (0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Real GDP/capita 
(in thousands) - 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.68 (0.52) 
-0.15 
(0.70) 
-0.15 
(0.59) 
(0.58) 
(0.65) 
P-value (F test) 0.32 0.26 0.02 0.00 
R-squared 0.29 0.42 - - 
Observations 22 22 22 22 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS (Newey-West) 
ARIMA 
(1,0,0) 
Notes: Dependent variable: percentage of incumbents reelected with at least 60% of the votes. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Regression 3 
utilizes Newey-West standard errors with assumed heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (up to lag 1) error 
structure. 
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Table A.22 
Determinants of Combined Democrat and Republican Ideology in the House of 
Representatives, 1948-2000 (Hypothesis 2 Testing) 
 1 2 3 
Percent of incumbents reelected 0.33* (0.17) 
0.33* 
(0.18) 
0.38*** 
(0.03) 
Redistricting dummy† - - - 
Voter turnout -0.10 (0.09) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
Bills per Congressman -0.004*** (0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
Percent of seats that changed party† - - - 
Constant 0.16 (0.15) 
0.16 
(0.14) - 
P-value (F test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.64 - - 
Observations 27 27 27 
Estimation Method 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV (Newey-West) ARCH (1/1) 
Notes: Dependent variable: Joint Democrat and Republican ideology index calculated as (|Dem| + Rep)/2. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
†Instruments used in the 1st stage regression (both are negative and statistically significant at 1%) where 
endogenous variable is percent incumbents reelected. Regression 2 utilizes Newey-West standard errors 
with assumed heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (up to lag 1) error structure. 
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